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Resum
Aquest projecte ens apropa als conceptes com les xarxes privades virtuals, els serveis de
seguretat (xifrar el tra`fic, validar la integritat, autenticar els extrems, evitar el repudi i evitar
la repeticio´) i les aplicacions distribuı¨des (peer to peer ).
Avui en dia, la funcio´ de permetre la unio´ de diferents ordenadors o xarxes locals en una
nova xarxa virtual, pot ser aprofitada per poder abstraure’s de les barreres imposades
per IPv4 com la limitacio´ d’adrec¸ament pu´blic. El fet d’afegir la component de privacitat
permet forc¸ar un entorn segur, de confianc¸a i independent del que puguin aportar les
aplicacions. El conjunt de la creacio´ de xarxes virtuals amb la component de privacitat
permet la creacio´ de xarxes privades virtuals tambe´ anomenades VPNs.
L’objectiu d’aquest projecte e´s dissenyar i implementar una aplicacio´ capac¸ de crear xarxes
privades virtuals que no depenguin de cap servidor central, sense que aixo` comprometi
la privacitat ni l’autenticacio´ dels integrants de la xarxa. L’aplicacio´ ha de ser capac¸ de
superar els routers NAT (que tradueixen les adreces IP permetent compartir una adrec¸a
pu´blica entre diferents ordenadors) per tal d’establir connexions bidireccionals directament
amb els veı¨ns de la xarxa virtual, proporcionant aixı´ una baixa late`ncia.
En fer els tests inicials es va trobar un problema relacionat amb la implementacio´ de
la llibreria OpenSSL del protocol segur utilitzat. Aquest error es presenta malgrat que
aparentment l’aplicacio´ fa un bon u´s d’aquesta llibreria. Aquest problema ha consumit
molt temps de dedicacio´ del projecte sense poder ser solucionat.
Com a resultats dels tests de l’aplicacio´ creada en comparacio´ amb les de les altres apli-
cacions existents: aquesta realitza una inicialitzacio´ breu, te una late`ncia baixa juntament
amb una desviacio´ esta`ndard molt baixa i permet taxes de transfere`ncia altes en TCP i
baixes en UDP.
Aquest document comenc¸a amb una introduccio´ a les xarxes privades virtuals i al projecte.
Seguidament, en el primer capı´tol s’exposa la descripcio´ i la comparativa de les tecnologi-
es de xarxes privades virtuals existents. En el segon s’explica el funcionament, el disseny
i l’arquitectura de l’aplicacio´ creada. En el tercer es presenten els resultats de les proves
realitzades amb l’aplicacio´ creada. I finalment hi ha les conclusions, la bibliografia i el
glossari.
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Overview
This project is close to the concepts like the virtual private networks, the security services
(encrypt the traffic, validate the integration, authenticate both ends, avoid the repudiation
and avoid repetitions) and the distributed applications (like peer to peer).
Nowadays, to allow to join different computers or local networks into a new virtual network
could be used to escape from the current barriers imposed by IPv4 limitations, like the
availability of public addresses. It also could be added an additional component to this
like the privacy of the communications, it could provide a safe and confident environment
independent from each one the user applications could supply. Both components as a
whole allow to create virtual private networks abbreviated as VPNs.
The main target of this project is to design and implement an application that permits
to create virtual private networks which did not need to any central server without any
compromise in the privacy nor the confidence in the authentication of the virtual network
members. The application needs to be able to reach directly the other members of the
virtual private network across NAT routers (network address translator routers, to share a
single IP with various computers) allowing a low latency.
During the initial tests a problem had appeared related to the implementation of the security
protocol used provided by OpenSSL library. This error appears even the usage of this
library seams correct. A lot of time had been expended with this problem without solving
it.
The results of the tests of the created application compared with the other existing applica-
tions are: small initialization, low latency together with a few standard deviation, high data
rates with TCP and low ones in UDP.
This document starts with an introduction to the virtual private networks and to this work.
The first chapter describes and compares the existing virtual private network technologies.
The second one explains how the created application works, how is designed and its
internal architecture. The third one present the results of the test done with the created
application. Finally there are the conclusions, the bibliography and a glossary.
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1INTRODUCCIO´
Internet actualment depe`n extensivament de IP1v4, i veient que a IPv6 encara li queda
camı´ per assolir la implementacio´ global, es pot dir que la limitacio´ d’adrec¸ament pu´blic
que provoca IPv4 seguira` existint a mig termini. La funcio´ de permetre la unio´ de diferents
ordenadors o LAN2s en una nova xarxa virtual, pot ser aprofitada per poder abstraure’s de
les barreres imposades per IPv4. La creacio´ d’aquestes xarxes virtuals e´s molt u´til, pero`
s’ha de tenir en compte que qualsevol que hi tingui acce´s sera` com si estigue´s connectat
directament amb les LANs i ordenadors que en formen part. E´s per aixo` que casi tot
programari que ofereix la creacio´ d’aquestes xarxes virtuals, tambe´ ofereix la possibilitat
d’afegir una capa de seguretat, que pot incloure tant l’autenticacio´ com l’encriptacio´ del
canal de dades. Aquesta solucio´ es denomina VPN3 i e´s la me´s utilitzada en tots els
a`mbits (de fet casi tota xarxa virtual utilitzada e´s una VPN). Tambe´ e´s una realitat que
la majoria d’aplicacions ja disposen d’una capa de seguretat pel transport de les seves
pro`pies dades, pero` la utilitzacio´ de VPNs permet forc¸ar un entorn segur, de confianc¸a i
independent de la de les aplicacions.
L’objectiu d’aquest projecte e´s dissenyar i implementar una aplicacio´ capac¸ de crear xarxes
privades virtuals que no depenguin de cap servidor central, sense que aixo` comprometi
la privacitat ni l’autenticacio´ dels integrants de la xarxa. L’aplicacio´ ha de ser capac¸ de
superar els routers NAT4 per tal d’establir connexions bidireccionals amb els veı¨ns de la
xarxa, proporcionant una baixa late`ncia. Tambe´ e´s interessant la utilitzacio´ d’adrec¸ament
autenticat, de manera que ningu´ no pugui falcejar la identitat dins de la VPN.
Aquest document comenc¸a amb la descripcio´ i la comparativa de les tecnologies de VPN
existents. Despre`s s’explica el funcionament, el disseny i l’arquitectura de l’aplicacio´ cre-
ada. Seguidament es presenten els resultats de les proves realitzades amb l’aplicacio´
creada. I finalment hi ha les conclusions, la bibliografia i el glossari.
1IP: Internet Protocol (versio´ 4 o 6)
2LAN: Local Area Network
3VPN: Virtual Private Network
4NAT: Network Address Translator
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CAPI´TOL 1. ESTUDI DE LA SITUACIO´ ACTUAL
1.1. Protocols i programaris existents
Els protocols de seguretat poden proveir part o la totalitat dels serveis de seguretat aquı´
esmentats:
• Xifrar el tra`fic de manera que no pugi ser llegit per ningu´ me´s que pels destinataris
originals.
• Validar la integritat per assegurar que el tra`fic no ha estat modificat durant el seu
recorregut.
• Autenticar els extrems per assegurar que el tra`fic prove´ d’un extrem de confianc¸a.
• Evitar el repudi de l’altre extrem per tal de que no pugui negar haver enviat la
informacio´.
• Evitar la repeticio´ malintencionada de paquets (l’anti-repeticio´).
A continuacio´ s’analitzaran alguns protocols i programaris existents que permeten la cre-
acio´ de VPNs.
1.1.1. IPsec
IPsec1 e´s d’u´s opcional en IPv4 i sera` obligatori en IPv6. IPsec va ser creat per propor-
cionar seguretat en dos possibles modes. El mode de transport (extrem a extrem), en
el que els ordenadors dels extrems finals realitzen el processat de seguretat del tra`fic de
paquets; i el mode tu´nel (porta a porta) en el que la seguretat del tra`fic de paquets e´s
proporcionada a va`ries ma`quines (inclu´s a tota la LAN) per un u´nic node.
IPsec va ser introduı¨t per proporcionar serveis de seguretat tals com: xifrar el tra`fic, va-
lidar la integritat, autenticar als extrems i l’anti-repeticio´. L’u´s principal d’IPsec e´s el de
crear VPNs en qualsevol dels dos modes, pero` les implicacions de seguretat so´n bastant
diferents entre els dos modes d’operacio´.
La majoria d’implementacions d’aquest protocol tenen problemes de compatibilitat amb
les altres implementacions del mateix protocol, degut a que cada fabricant interpreta els
RFC2s i s’adapta el protocol a la seva mida.
L’intercanvi de claus a escala Internet e´s va desenvolupar me´s tard i utilitza la infraes-
tructura de clau pu´blica universal DNSSEC3, pero` la utilitzacio´ d’aquesta tecnologia no es
troba en gaires implementacions d’IPsec.
1IPsec: Internet Protocol security
2RFC: Request for Comments from IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)
3DNSSEC: Domain Name System Security Extensions
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Aixı´ doncs depenent del nivell en el que actuı¨ l’IPsec, aquest estara` treballant en mode
transport o mode tu´nel.
1.1.1.1. Mode transport
En mode transport, nome´s es xifra i/o autentica el payload (la carga u´til) del paquet IP.
Per tant al no tocar les capc¸aleres IP no afecta a l’enrutament (o encaminament), pero`
si s’utilitza l’AH4 les direccions IP no poden ser traduı¨des (com fa per exemple un NAT)
ja que aixo` faria que el valor del hash (resum) no coincidı´s. Aquest mode s’utilitza en
comunicacions ordinador a ordinador.
Per tal de travessar els NATs existeix un mecanisme d’encapsulacio´ de missatges IPsec
anomanat NAT-T5 en un RFC (veure [1] i [2]).
1.1.1.2. Mode tu´nel
En el mode tu´nel, es xifra i/o autentica tot el paquet IP sencer (capc¸alera inclusiva). Aques-
ta informacio´ s’encapsula dins del payload d’un nou paquet IP per tal de que pugui ser
enrutat. Aquest mode s’utilitza en comunicacions xarxa a xarxa, per exemple per crear
VPNs a trave´s d’Internet.
1.1.2. OpenVPN
OpenVPN e´s un programa de VPN a nivell d’aplicacio´ molt configurable. Per explicar les
seves possibilitats s’explicaran els tres grups de configuracio´ principals.
• Modes de la VPN: Especifica el contingut que ha de circular dins de la VPN.
• Topologies internes: Especifica com veuen els sistemes operatius la interfı´cie de
la VPN.
• Modes de funcionament: Especifica el comportament de la aplicacio´.
Mijanc¸ant el driver gene`ric i multiplataforma TUN/TAP l’aplicacio´ pot crear dos modes de
VPN:
• Mode pont Ethernet: Simula una interfı´cie de xarxa Ethernet i crea una VPN que
treballa amb trames de capa 2 del model OSI6.
• Mode tu´nel IP: Simula una interfı´cie de xarxa punt-a-punt i crea una VPN que tre-
balla amb paquets de capa 3 del model OSI.
4AH: Authentication Header (per me´s informacio´ consultar l’annex C)
5NAT-T: NAT Traversal in the IKE
6model OSI: Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model
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OpenVPN en mode pont Ethernet sempre utilitza una u´nica interfı´cie de xarxa en cada
ma`quina per tota la VPN. Pero´ en el mode tu´nel IP pot treballar [3] en diferents topologies
internes:
• p2p (point-to-point): Utilitza una interfı´cie de xarxa punt-a-punt al servidor per a
cada client connectat, i el sistema operatiu del servidor s’encarrega de l’enrutat. Els
clients nome´s veuen el servidor i han d’utilitzar-lo com a router per accedir a la resta
de clients de la VPN. Aquest mode no e´s compatible amb les ma`quines que utilitzin
Microsoft Windows.
• net30: Utilitza una interfı´cie de xarxa al servidor per a cada client connectat. Tant
els clients com el servidor en les seves interfı´cies, utilitzen subxarxes /30 i per tant
el sistema operatiu del servidor tambe´ s’encarrega de l’enrutat. Els clients seguei-
xen veient nome´s al servidor i han d’utilitzar-lo com a router per accedir a la resta
de clients de la VPN. Aquest mode e´s compatible amb les ma`quines que utilitzin
Microsoft Windows.
• subnet: Utilitza una u´nica interfı´cie de xarxa en cada ma`quina per tota la VPN,
com en el mode Ethernet. Per tant, e´s l’aplicacio´ qui s’encarrega de l’enrutat de la
VPN. Aquest mode tambe´ e´s compatible amb les ma`quines que utilitzin Microsoft
Windows.
L’aplicacio´ independentment de la configuracio´ anterior te´ diferents modes de funciona-
ment:
• Mode punt-a-punt: Crea una VPN amb nome´s 2 extrems.
• Mode servidor: Permet que se li connectin varis clients.
• Mode client: Permet connectar-se al servidor.
Figura 1.1: Topologia d’una VPN centralitzada
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Per tant podem dir que e´s tracta d’una aplicacio´ pensada per VPNs centralitzades (en la
figura 1.1 es mostra un diagrama d’aquesta topologia).
A nivell de seguretat utilitza la llibreria OpenSSL7 tant per TCP8 com per UDP9: en TCP
utilitza l’esta`ndard TLS10 i en UDP utilitza un protocol propi basat en TLS. Permet l’au-
tenticacio´ per claus secretes compartides pre`viament, per certificats x509 i per usuari-
contrasenya.
1.1.3. TincVPN
TincVPN e´s un programa de VPNs a nivell d’aplicacio´, que fa u´s del driver gene`ric i mul-
tiplataforma TUN/TAP. Mitjanc¸ant aquest driver l’aplicacio´ pot crear VPNs en mode pont
Ethernet o en mode tu´nel IP, ja explicats anteriorment. L’aplicacio´ crea una VPN mallada
(figura 1.2) connectant-se a una llista de peers (nodes client i servidor), i la resta de peers
de la VPN hauran de ser enrutats a trave´s d’altres peers per arribar als nodes que no
tinguin connexio´ directe (veure [4]).
Figura 1.2: Topologia d’una VPN mallada
Utilitza una u´nica interfı´cie de xarxa en cada ma`quina per tota la VPN, com en la topologia
interna subnet de OpenVPN. Per tant, e´s cada peer de la VPN qui s’encarrega a nivell
d’aplicacio´ del bridging (adrec¸ar les trames Ethernet al destı´ correcte) en mode pont Et-
hernet o del routing (enrutament: adrec¸ar els paquets IP cap al camı´ correcte) en mode
tu´nel IP.
A nivell de seguretat utilitza un protocol propi tant en TCP com en UDP. Pot treballar
nome´s amb TCP, o utilitzar el TCP nome´s com a canal de control i el UDP per les dades.
7SSL: Secure Socket Layer (la versio´ 3 en convertir-se en esta`ndard es va anomenar TLS)
8TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
9UDP: User Datagram Protocol
10TLS: Transport Layer Security (per me´s informacio´ consultar l’annex C)
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Peter Gutmann va trobar nombroses errades de disseny en la seguretat del protocol de la
versio´ 1 d’aquest programa que encara no s’han resolt (veure [5] i [6]: a l’annex B es troba
l’e-mail on exposa el seu ana`lisi).
1.1.4. Wippien
Wippien e´s un programa de missatgeria instanta`nia amb funcionalitats de creacio´ de VPNs
a nivell d’aplicacio´. Utilitza XMPP11 com a missatgeria instanta`nia. Una vegada connectat
al servidor XMPP, l’aplicacio´ mostra a l’usuari la seva llista de contactes per tal que esculli
amb quins contactes vol crear la VPN. Per crear-la negocia els para`metres de la VPN (com
la IP pu´blica, el port i el protocol) a trave´s d’XMPP. Tambe´ utilitza HTTP cap a un servidor
anomenat mediator, que fa la funcio´ de DHCP12 assignant una IP u´nica per sessio´ a cada
peer de la VPN; d’aquesta manera es garanteix que no hi hagi conflictes d’IPs. Per tant
podem dir que Wippien crea VPNs mallades i completament connectades per cada anella
de confianc¸a, amb autenticacio´ (i assignacio´ de les IPs) per part d’un servidor central
extern (veure la figura 1.3).
Figura 1.3: Topologia d’una VPN amb autenticacio´ externa
Utilitza una u´nica interfı´cie de xarxa en cada ma`quina per tota la VPN, com en la topologia
interna subnet de OpenVPN. Per tant, e´s cada peer qui s’encarrega de l’enrutat de la
VPN a nivell d’aplicacio´. Totes les IPs de les VPNs que utilitzin el seu servidor mediator
pertanyen a la xarxa 5.0.0.0/8 (veure [7]).
A nivell de seguretat utilitza un protocol propi amb l’algoritme de xifratge AES128, mitjanc¸ant
un component privatiu13 anomenat wodVPN ActiveX [8]; aquest component e´s NAT fri-
endly (esta` preparat per travessar els routers NAT) i suporta tant TCP com UDP.
11XMPP: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
12DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
13component privatiu: part d’un programa privatiu (per me´s informacio´ consultar el concepte proprietary
software a l’annex C)
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1.1.5. Hamachi
Hamachi e´s un programa privatiu de VPNs a nivell d’aplicacio´ que suporta tant tu´nels IP
com tu´nels IPX14. El programa utilitza una connexio´ a un servidor central com a canal
de control (veure [9]). En arrancar efectua el proce´s d’autenticacio´ amb aquest servidor i
efectua el descobriment del canal del client per assegurar la connectivitat en cas d’existir
routers NAT (per tant e´s una aplicacio´ NAT friendly ). Finalment el servidor entrega al
client la seva llista de VPNs juntament amb la llista dels membres connectats. Aquesta
llista e´s actualitzada cada cop que aquests entren o surten de l’aplicacio´. Tal com s’ha dit
el servidor ajuda: en el proce´s de superar els routers NAT, en el proce´s d’autenticacio´ i en
el descobriment de peers (veure la figura 1.3).
Utilitza una u´nica interfı´cie de xarxa en cada ma`quina per tota la VPN. Per tant, e´s cada
peer qui s’encarrega de l’enrutat de la VPN a nivell d’aplicacio´. Totes les IPs de les VPNs
pertanyen a la xarxa 5.0.0.0/8.
A nivell de seguretat la VPN utilitza un protocol propi sobre UDP.
1.1.6. ELA VPN
ELA15 e´s un programa de VPN a nivell d’aplicacio´. Utilitza una topologia de nodes mallada
(veure la figura 1.2) connectada amb un protocol propi tant amb TCP com amb UDP.
D’aquesta tecnologia no s’ha trobat cap implementacio´, i el paper descriptiu [10] es troba
adjunt a l’annex A.
1.2. Comparativa
Per acabar, la taula 1.1 fa un resum de les tecnologies analitzades en aquest capı´tol.
Nom Lliure Funcionament Protocol Seguretat
IPsec Sı´ Descentralitzat IP Esta`ndard
OpenVPN Sı´ Centralitzat TCP/UDP TLS/Propi
TincVPN Sı´ Mallat TCP/UDP Propi
Wippien No Mallat amb Servidor TCP/UDP Propi
Hamachi No Mallat amb Servidor UDP Propi
ELA VPN No Mallat Jera`rquic TCP/UDP Propi
Taula 1.1: Comparativa dels protocols i programaris existents
De les tecnologies de nivell d’aplicacio´ disponibles esmentades, nome´s TincVPN permet
la creacio´ de VPNs sense necessitar un servidor central. ELA VPN, tal com s’ha exposat,
14IPX: Internetwork Packet Exchange
15ELA: Everywhere Local Area network [10]
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no esta` disponible i per tant tambe´ quedaria descartada. Tot i aixı´, cap d’aquestes tecno-
logies permet la utilitzacio´ d’adrec¸ament autenticat que ha estat definit com a objectiu; per
tant aquestes opcions es descarten per no complir la majoria d’objectius. Per altre banda,
IPsec permetria la majoria dels objectius, pero` degut a que la implementacio´ necessita
estar integrada al nucli dels sistemes operatius i que les diferents implementacions tenen
problemes de compatibilitat entre elles, aquesta opcio´ tambe´ es descarta.
10 Xarxa Mesh Privada Virtual
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CAPI´TOL 2. PROGRAMACIO´
2.1. Objectiu de l’aplicacio´
L’objectiu de l’aplicacio´ e´s ser capac¸ de crear xarxes privades virtuals que no depenguin
de cap servidor central, superar els routers NAT i proporcionar una baixa late`ncia.
L’aplicacio´ d’aquest projecte s’ha d’executar com un servei i proveir nome´s una interfı´cie
virtual de xarxa. Per tant l’usuari no disposa de cap interfı´cie gra`fica, pero` els missatges de
l’aplicacio´ queden guardats en un fitxer al disc per tal de ser consultats en cas necessari.
Tant la gestio´ dels certificats com la obtencio´ del llistat inicial de nodes coneguts (tambe´
pot ser nome´s un sol node) no formen part de l’aplicacio´ i so´n tasques de gestio´ que s’han
de realitzar manualment.
2.1.1. Funcionament de l’aplicacio´
L’aplicacio´ d’aquest projecte, en arrancar, es posa en contacte amb els nodes que te´
pre`viament configurats com a coneguts. Per cada node s’intercanvia la informacio´ ne-
cessa`ria per tal de crear el canal segur i poder-se identificar i enrutar els paquets. Per tal
que el NAT no tanqui el port d’entrada, cal que l’aplicacio´ no pari d’enviar paquets a tots el
nodes. Aquests paquets es poden aprofitar per informar dels altres nodes coneguts, per
aixı´ garantir una malla completament connectada (veure figura 2.1).
Figura 2.1: Topologia d’una VPN mallada completament connectada
Una vegada creada la malla l’aplicacio´ ja pot enrutar directament a cada node el tra`fic
que li correspon, sense haver de passar per cap altre node i permetent aixı´ una baixa
late`ncia. Per evitar afegir me´s capc¸aleres de les necessa`ries (overhead) l’aplicacio´ enviara`
directament els paquets IP enlloc de les trames Ethernet.
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2.2. Disseny del protocol
L’objectiu a nivell de seguretat e´s que tots els nodes puguin realitzar els tu´nels garantint
els serveis criptogra`fics del xifrat, l’autenticacio´ i el no repudi. De manera que cada node
te´ la certesa d’estar entregant la informacio´ directament al destı´ indicat, sabent que cap
altre pot estar ni llegint ni manipulant. Els altres nodes tambe´ tenen la mateixa certesa de
rebre la informacio´ de l’origen indicat.
2.2.1. Enrutament segur
Per assolir aquest objectiu juntament amb el de la baixa late`ncia s’han de realitzar con-
nexions directes entre tots els nodes, i no es poden realitzar agregacions de nodes com
tı´picament es fa en xarxes P2P1 mitjanc¸ant nodes relay. Fer agregacions posaria la infor-
macio´ en mans d’altres membres de la VPN, els quals no tenen perque` ser de confianc¸a
pels dos interessats en la comunicacio´. Tambe´ e´s necessari un mecanisme de validacio´
de les rutes que cada node ofereix (o comparteix), de manera que cap node no pugui can-
viar l’adrec¸a IP per una que pertanyi a un altre node. Aquesta u´ltima necessitat si no es
vol dependre de cap servidor mediator (que faci de DHCP) obligara` a fixar un adrec¸ament
IP esta`tic.
Per tant el primer que cal establir e´s el funcionament de l’adrec¸ament IP. Per a fer-ho es
contemplen dues possibilitats: la utilitzacio´ d’un adrec¸ament que es calculi a partir dels
certificats o la incrustacio´ de l’adrec¸ament dins d’algun camp dels certificats. La primera
opcio´ consisteix en definir una distribucio´ de direccions IP, en la que a partir d’un certificat
es pugui assignar una u´nica IP. Aixo` facilita la generacio´ de certificats ja que es poden
utilitzar certificats gene`rics, pero` en canvi es corre el risc de que l’algoritme esmentat tin-
gui col·lisions i per tant hi hagi conflictes d’IPs compartides. Per seguretat s’optara` per
la segona opcio´ malgrat que aquesta sigui me´s costosa pels administradors dels certi-
ficats. Aquesta consistira` en utilitzar algun camp dels certificats per emmagatzemar les
polı´tiques d’assignacio´ d’IPs de forma que els administradors de la VPN la validin al signar
el certificat des de la CA2.
Despre´s d’examinar els camps de les extensions x509v3 per a certificats, es va trobar una
entrada anomenada nameConstraints. Aquesta entrada permet definir mu´ltiples tipus de
permisos (tant de permetre com d’excloure, veure exemple a la taula 2.1 o [11]).
nameConstraints=permitted;IP:192.168.0.0/255.255.0.0
nameConstraints=permitted;email:.somedomain.com
nameConstraints=excluded;email:.com
Taula 2.1: Exemples de x509v3 nameConstraints
Per a aquesta aplicacio´ nome´s es fara` u´s dels permisos de tipus IP. D’aquesta manera e´s
la CA l’encarregada d’assegurar-se que no validi cap certificat amb una IP ja assignada
pre`viament, aixı´ com tambe´ de mantenir un registre de les IPs assignades.
1P2P: Peer to peer
2CA: Certificate Authority (per me´s informacio´ consultar l’annex C)
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Pel disseny del protocol es necessita un identificador u´nic per cada node. Es va pensar i
valorar per a aquesta aplicacio´ les segu¨ents opcions:
• La IP i port del node
• La IP pu´blica i port del node
• Agrupacio´ de IPs i ports (locals i pu´blics)
• Xarxes que publica el node
La utilitzacio´ de la IP i el port no e´s informacio´ suficient degut a l’existe`ncia de xarxes
privades i pu´bliques. La utilitzacio´ de la IP pu´blica per aquesta tasca no e´s valida ja que
deixa de ser u´nica si hi ha dos nodes al costat privat abans d’un NAT. Aquests dos en
trobar-se es pensaran que so´n nodes diferents dels que coneixen amb IP pu´blica. La
utilitzacio´ de l’agrupacio´ de IPs i ports tant locals com pu´blics sembla prou va`lida, pero` de
vegades s’utilitza un NAT per ajuntar diferents subxarxes de mateix identificador de xarxa.
Les xarxes que publica o ofereix un node e´s una informacio´ validada per la CA i no pot
ser repetida per cap altre node de la VPN. E´s per aixo` que aquesta u´ltima opcio´ sera` la
utilitzada alhora d’identificar els nodes.
2.2.2. Transport segur
Pel que fa a la informacio´ a transportar, el protocol IP esta` dissenyat per un medi hostil
on els paquets es desordenen o es perden, pero` l’u´s de TCP permet oblidar-se d’aquest
medi ja que s’encarrega de l’ordenacio´ i de la recuperacio´ de les pe`rdues. Degut a que
la majoria de comunicacions utilitzen TCP, una VPN transmetra` majorita`riament paquets
TCP encapulats dins del protocol que utilitzin pel transport. En el cas d’utilitzar una VPN
sobre TCP i haver-hi congestio´ a la xarxa, aquesta provocaria la pe`rdua dels paquets de
la connexio´ de la VPN i per tant tambe´ dels paquets TCP que hi so´n encapsulats. Com a
consequ¨e`ncia, les dos piles (stacks) de TCP reenviarien els paquets perduts de forma que
la xarxa encara es saturaria me´s, tenint cada cop me´s paquets iguals retransmetent-se.
El protocol IP permet enviar paquets sense control de pe`rdues mitjanc¸ant UDP, aquest
protocol e´s el que la majoria de VPNs intenten utilitzar per millorar l’eficie`ncia en el cas
explicat anteriorment. A me´s a me´s no perjudica en cap mesura, ja que com s’ha dit el
protocol IP que va dins de la VPN esta` dissenyat per un medi amb pe`rdues. El programari
de VPNs es complica ja que malgrat sembli que UDP sigui la solucio´ no hi ha implemen-
tacions conegudes de capes de seguretat sobre UDP. E´s per aixo` que la majoria d’elles
opten per implementar els seus protocols propis de seguretat.
Malgrat no haver-hi implementacions de protocols de seguretat conegudes sobre UDP,
es decideix no utilitzar el TCP i buscar intensament alguna implementacio´ el me´s segura
possible o fins hi tot a poder ser esta`ndard. Finalment es troba un protocol del 2004
basat en TLS, que van dissenyar N. Modadugu i E. Rescorla de la universitat d’Stanford,
anomenat DTLS3 i me´s tard el 2006 va esdevenir el RFC 4347 [12] del IETF. A l’annex
A es pot veure el paper inicial que descriu el protocol. El mateix equip va treballar en
3DTLS: Datagram Transport Layer Security
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una variant del DTLS [13] (l’esborrany RFC ha caducat i es diu Extensions for Datagram
Transport Layer Security (TLS) in Low Bandwidth Environments) per estalviar bits en les
capc¸eleres DTLS per a entorns amb poc ample de banda. Proposaven treure els camps
repetits a cada record de TLS i DTLS que segons ells no so´n necessaris. Degut a que
aquesta variant no va tenir massa e`xit i no va esdevenir RFC, en aquest projecte es fara`
u´s del DTLS que descriu el RFC 4347 [12]. Aquest protocol es troba implementat en
les versions me´s recents de la llibreria OpenSSL i e´s la implementacio´ que s’ha decidit
utilitzar.
2.2.3. Conclusions
Peter Gutmann va analitzar nombroses aplicacions VPN i en va descriure les nombroses
errades de disseny dels protocols de seguretat. L’error que remarca e´s que la majoria
d’elles volien simplificar els esta`ndards segurs ja que so´n complicats, pero` conclou que
un protocol segur en la seva totalitat e´s complexe (veure [5]: a l’annex B es troba l’e-mail
on s’exposa el seu ana`lisi). Per tant la opcio´ de crear un protocol de seguretat propi queda
descartada i s’escull la utilitzacio´ d’un protocol existent i segur com el DTLS, amb el valor
afegit de ser un protocol esta`ndard.
Per acabar la seccio´, i com a curiositat, a l’annex B (veure [14]) hi ha una conversa d’e-
mails explicant que` passa quan dins d’una VPN hi traspassen dades xifrades externament,
com per exemple una connexio´ HTTPS4. En aquest escenari la informacio´ seria xifrada 2
cops. Si coincidissin mu´ltiples factors, el xifratge resultant podria esdevenir menys segur.
Pero` no hi ha cap implementacio´ que ho tingui en compte ja que la probabilitat de que
coincidissin es molt baixa, aixı´ que tampoc no es tindra` en compte en aquest programari.
2.3. Especificacio´ del protocol
Les VPN encapsulen tra`fic IP dins del protocol IP, de manera que la ma`xima informacio´
que poden contenir els paquets IP encapsulats e´s menor. El protocol definit per donar
seguretat permet tant el xifratge com la compressio´, i aixo` complica el ca`lcul de la ma`xima
informacio´ que poden contenir els paquets; e´s per aquest motiu que en primera insta`ncia
es forc¸ara` que la fragmentacio´ dels paquets la faci el sistema operatiu i els routers d’en-
tremig, per tant no s’implementara` cap fragmentacio´ dina`mica dins del programa. En el
futur la implementacio´ de la fragmentacio´ dina`mica dins del programa es faria seguint
l’esta`ndard de IP, i d’aquesta manera seria transparent al protocol del programa. Per evi-
tar afegir me´s capc¸aleres (overhead) en aquests paquets, ja que so´n els me´s importants
i frequ¨ents, l’aplicacio´ enviara` directament els paquets IP sense afegir cap capc¸alera ni
identificador (veure taula 2.2).
Els altres paquets, considerats d’u´s exclusivament intern, fan la funcio´ de senyalitzacio´
de la VPN. Tal com es veu en la taula 2.3, aquests tenen un format que esta` inspirat en
els 4 primers bytes de la capc¸alera IP, i es poden diferenciar pel primer byte que en IP
4HTTPS: Hypertext Transfer Protocol over SSL
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bits 0–3 4–7 8–15 16-18 19–31
0 Version HLen ToS Total Lenght
32 Identification Flags Fragment Offset
64 TTL Protocol Header Checksum
96 Source Address
128 Destination Address
160 Options (Optional)
=0 Data
+32 . . .
Taula 2.2: Packet IPv4
bits 0–3 4–7 8–15 16–31
0 0000 0001 Pkt ID Total Lenght
Taula 2.3: Capc¸alera Packet Intern
defineix la versio´ del protocol i la longitud de les capc¸aleres (HLen). El tercer byte, que
en IP esta` destinat a ToS5, en els paquets de senyalitzacio´ servira` per definir el tipus de
paquet intern. Els tipus de paquets so´n: paquets identification (ID), paquets identification
acknowledgment (ID ACK) i paquets keep alive (KA). El seu u´s dins de la comunicacio´ es
mostra en la figura 2.2 i s’expliquen a continuacio´.
Figura 2.2: Diagrama de flux de la comunicacio´
2.3.1. Paquet Identification
Els paquets Identification (ID) descriuen al node que l’envia. Per descriure’l s’envien els
segu¨ents blocs d’informacio´:
• Xarxes que publica el node: fa d’identificador del node.
• Agrupacions de IP i port: altres vies per comunicar-se amb el node.
5ToS: Type of Service
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En el paquet (taula 2.4), primer s’envien el nu´mero d’entrades que contenen els dos blocs
d’informacio´, tot seguit s’envia el primer bloc amb totes les xarxes que el node publica
i despre`s, en el segon bloc, totes les agrupacions de IP i port. Aquest tipus de paquet
utilitza com a identificador de paquet intern el valor hexadecimal 0x00.
bits 0–3 4–7 8–15 16–31
0 0000 0001 0x00 Total Lenght
32 # Networks # IP-Ports
48 Network IP
80 Network Netmask
112 . . .
144 . . .
=0 Host IP
+32 UDP Port
+48 . . .
+80 . . .
Taula 2.4: Paquet ID
2.3.2. Paquet Identification Acknowledgment
Els paquets Identification Acknowledgment (ID ACK) confirmen haver rebut el paquet ID.
El paquet (taula 2.5) no conte´ cap me´s informacio´ addicional tal com es pot veure en la
seva estructura. Aquest tipus de paquet utilitza com a identificador de paquet intern el
valor hexadecimal 0x01.
bits 0–3 4–7 8–15 16–31
0 0000 0001 0x01 0x04
Taula 2.5: Paquet ID ACK
2.3.3. Paquet Keep Alive
Els routers NAT s’utilitzen generalment per compartir una mateixa IP entre ma`quines di-
ferents. El router desa cada connexio´ en memo`ria per tal de reutilitzar els mateixos
para`metres en travessar me´s dades per la connexio´. Tots els routers NAT assignen un
temps de vida a la informacio´ guardada en memo`ria i el renoven a mesura que circulen
dades de la connexio´. En el moment que caduca el temps de vida, la connexio´ es perd
sense que cap dels participants se n’adonin, e´s per aixo` que e´s important assegurar-se
de que el router no arribi a esgotar aquest temps de vida.
El paquet Keep Alive (KA) te´ dos objectius: mantenir el canal obert i ajudar a mallar la
VPN. El primer objectiu fa que enviar aquest paquet nome´s sigui necessari quan no s’ha
enviat cap altre informacio´ al canal, en canvi el segon objectiu fa que sigui necessari
enviar-lo cada cert temps. D’aquesta manera es defineixen dos temps configurables que
Programacio´ 17
s’anomenaran tmin i tmax. La polı´tica d’enviament resultant consisteix en enviar un paquet
KA cada tmin des de l’u´ltim paquet transme`s pel canal, i en cas de no haver-se enviat cap
paquet d’aquests durant tmax es forc¸aria l’enviament malgrat no fos necessari pel primer
objectiu.
bits 0–3 4–7 8–15 16–31
0 0000 0001 0x02 Total Lenght
32 # Peers
40 # Networks # IP-Ports
56 Network IP
88 Network Netmask
120 . . .
152 . . .
=0 Host IP
+32 UDP Port
+48 . . .
+80 . . .
=0 . . . . . .
+16 . . .
+48 . . .
=0 . . .
+32 . . .
Taula 2.6: Paquet KA
Per tal de complir el segon objectiu fa falta afegir informacio´ dels altres nodes de la VPN
dins del paquet, la informacio´ necessa`ria e´s la mateixa que la continguda al paquet ID.
En el paquet (taula 2.6), primer s’envia el nombre de nodes que es descriuran. Tot seguit
s’enviara el mateix contingut dels paquets ID un darrera l’altre. Per tant aquest paquet,
porta la informacio´ suficient per a poder establir una connexio´ amb cada un dels nodes que
descriu tot mantenint el canal obert pels routers NAT, fent aixı´ la funcio´ de hole punching
(aquest concepte es troba definit en un paper [15] a l’annex A). Aquest tipus de paquet
utilitza com a identificador de paquet intern el valor hexadecimal 0x02.
2.4. Arquitectura del programa
L’arquitectura del programa, com es veu en la figura 2.3, es separa entre l’adaptador virtual
i el servidor UDP. Per altre banda hi ha un temporitzador que s’encarrega de llanc¸ar els
esdeveniments que depenguin del temps, com l’enviament de paquets Keep Alive o el
reenviament de paquets Identification.
Els paquets que les aplicacions envien a trave´s de l’adaptador virtual so´n enrutats i enviats
de servidor UDP a servidor UDP on retornen a un altre adaptador virtual i a la ma`quina
de destı´. Aquest dos s’han implementat mitjanc¸ant threads i so´n capac¸os d’enrutar i xifrar
o desxifrar mu´ltiples paquets simulta`niament.
Per a la realitzacio´ d’aquesta aplicacio´, e´s necessari programar tots els components del
diagrama (figura 2.3) a excepcio´ del DTLS, on tal com s’ha especificat anteriorment, s’uti-
litzara` la implementacio´ de la llibreria OpenSSL.
Pel desenvolupament d’aquesta aplicacio´ s’ha escollit el llenguatge C per ser un lleguatge
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Figura 2.3: Diagrama de processos de la aplicacio´
de baix nivell (permetent treballar el me´s proper possible als bits) i poder optimitzar-la per
aconseguir baixes late`ncies. Tambe´ s’ha decidit utilitzar la llibreria de threads de POSIX6
per la seva pote`ncia i la compatibilitat amb altres sistemes operatius.
L’eleccio´ d’aquest llenguatge juntament amb la utilitzacio´ de threads ha comportat mu´ltiples
dificultats en la gestio´ dels recursos compartits entre els diferents threads, pero` el resultat
hauria d’aprofitar millor els recursos de les ma`quines node.
2.4.1. Interfı´cie TUN
L’aplicacio´ fa u´s del driver gene`ric TUN/TAP. S’ha escollit aquest driver ja que esta` dis-
ponible per la majoria de sistemes operatius i facilitara` la possible futura adaptacio´ de
l’aplicacio´. El driver TUN/TAP e´s un driver de kernel d’una targeta de xarxa virtual, i per
tant no depe`n de cap targeta real fı´sica. Aquest driver es separa en dos sub-drivers:
• Driver TAP simula una interfı´cie de xarxa Ethernet i treballa amb trames de capa 2
del model OSI.
• Driver TUN simula una interfı´cie de xarxa punt-a-punt i treballa amb trames de capa
3 del model OSI.
En aquestes targetes virtuals els paquets enviats pel sistema operatiu al driver so´n pas-
sats a l’aplicacio´ que treballa fora del kernel i del driver. Els paquets que l’aplicacio´ en-
trega al driver so´n passats directament al sistema operatiu per a ser tractats pel stack de
protocols del kernel.
El diagrama d’aquesta part de l’aplicacio´ esta` en la figura 2.4. El primer que fa el node en
rebre un paquet de la interfı´cie TUN e´s comprovar que el paquet provingui d’una adrec¸a
6POSIX: Portable Operating System Interface
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Figura 2.4: Diagrama de flux del thread TUN
IP que els altres nodes reconeguin com a pro`pia d’ell, despre`s busca el node a qui va
destinat i li envia pel canal xifrat. En el cas de no complir algun dels requisits es descarta
el paquet sense notificar-ho.
2.4.2. Servidor UDP/DTLS
Tal com s’ha definit anteriorment el servidor UDP utilitza el protocol DTLS. La figura 2.5
mostra el diagrama d’aquesta part de l’aplicacio´ un cop desxifrat el paquet. En arribar
un paquet es separa entre paquets IP o paquets interns, despre´s els paquets interns
s’identifiquen pel seu identificador de paquet intern separant aixı´ entre ID, ID Ack i KA.
Els paquets IP es comproven que vaguin destinats a una adrec¸a IP de les que s’han
anunciat inicialment amb els paquets ID. Es comprova tambe´ que vinguin d’una IP validada
de les anunciades pel node de procede`ncia.
Els paquets ID es comproven que no siguin d’un node ja conegut i que publiquin xarxes
d’acord al seu certificat, tot seguit se li retorna un paquet ID Ack. En cas de que no hagi
rebut un paquet ID amb anterioritat, se li enviara` tambe´ un paquet ID. Finalment s’afegeix
el node a la base de dades, excepte en el cas de no complir les condicions inicials que es
tancaria la connexio´ DTLS.
Els paquets ID Ack anoten conforme l’altre node ha rebut satisfacto`riament el paquet ID,
per poder ser consultat en rebre un paquet ID.
Els paquets KA afegeixen tota la informacio´ dels nodes rebuda a la base de dades de
nodes pendents de connectar. Cada cert temps el temporitzador del programa compro-
vara` aquestes dades i intentara` connectar-se a ells. El temporitzador que mante´ oberts
els ports als routers NAT, aquest s’actualitza cada cop que es rep un paquet va`lid.
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Figura 2.5: Diagrama de flux del thread UDP
2.5. Gestio´ de la VPN
Tal com s’ha comentat a principis d’aquest capı´tol, certes tasques so´n externes al progra-
mari creat i s’han de realitzar manualment. D’aquestes tasques, algunes so´n exclusives
de l’administrador de la VPN, pero` d’altres les ha de realitzar el mateix usuari. En la figura
2.6 es mostren les diferents tasques necessa`ries per tal de poder gestionar la VPN. En
aquesta figura la part blava fa referencia a tasques de gestio´, la groga a comunicacions,
la taronja a l’utilitzacio´ de eines externes i la verda al propi programa creat.
A continuacio´ s’exposa el procediment que l’usuari ha de realitzar inicialment per preparar
l’aplicacio´:
1. Aconseguir un certificat firmat i un rang IP.
2. Configurar l’aplicacio´ per utilitzar el certificat i una IP del rang assignat.
3. Demanar la llista de nodes coneguts a algun membre (o a l’administrador de la
VPN).
4. Instal·lar la llista de nodes coneguts aconseguida.
5. Arrancar l’aplicacio´.
Una vegada realitzat aquest procediment inicial l’usuari pot fer u´s dels serveis de dins
de la VPN. Les pro`ximes vegades que l’usuari vulgui tornar a accedir a la VPN nome´s
necessitara` arrancar l’aplicacio´.
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Figura 2.6: Diagrama de casos d’u´s
Com aclariment, seguidament s’explica un exemple del primer pas del procediment ante-
rior (aconseguir el certificat firmat per la CA):
1. L’usuari demana accedir a la VPN a l’administrador.
2. L’administrador li assigna temporalment una IP.
3. L’administrador informa a l’usuari del procediment per generar una peticio´ de cer-
tificat amb la IP assignada.
4. L’usuari genera la peticio´ de certificat amb: la IP assignada, el seu nom, etc.
5. L’usuari s’identifica a l’administrador (mitjanc¸ant alguna documentacio´ oficial) i li
entrega la peticio´ de certificat.
6. L’administrador comprova la identificacio´, verificant que esta` autoritzat a accedir a
la VPN.
7. L’administrador li assigna definitivament la IP.
8. L’administrador entrega a l’usuari el certificat firmat per la CA.
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CAPI´TOL 3. TESTS I RESULTATS
3.1. Metodologia
En aquest capı´tol s’exposaran els resultats dels tests realitzats per comparar l’aplicacio´
creada amb el programari existent. En tots els programes s’han utilitzat certificats de 1024
bits i s’ha activat la compressio´ permesa per cada l’aplicacio´; el motiu d’activar la com-
pressio´ e´s que la llibreria OpenSSL utilitzada per la creacio´ del VPMN1 (el programa creat
en aquest projecte) no permet desactivar la compressio´ en temps d’execucio´. L’escenari
dels tests consta d’una xarxa Gigabit Ethernet on hi estan connectats dos ordenadors:
1. Debian GNU/Linux (PC amd64)
• AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual Core Processor BE-2400 (2.3GHz, 1024KB cache)
• nForce Gigabit Ethernet CK804
2. Debian GNU/Linux (PC i686)
• Intel Pentium M Centrino Processor (1.70GHz, 2048KB cache)
• Realtek Gigabit Ethernet RTL-8169
3.1.1. Eficie`ncia
Per analitzar l’eficie`ncia dels programes s’analitzen els bytes transmesos durant la inicia-
litzacio´, en el cas de la connexio´ directe es conten els bytes de les peticions ARP2 i en la
resta de casos s’exclouen. Tambe´ s’analitzen els bytes transmesos durant l’enviament de
paquets ICMP3 de echo (ping) de 56 bytes (contant la capa IP so´n 84 bytes/paquet). Els
resultats es contaran en bytes sense comptar la capa Ethernet (14 bytes/trama).
En el moment d’analitzar els resultats s’ha de tenir en compte que TincVPN no intercan-
via certificats durant la inicialitzacio´: en el seu lloc les claus pu´bliques dels altres nodes
s’han d’instal·lar al configurar el programari (per tenir una idea del que ocupen 2 certifi-
cats de 1024 bits: 830 ·2= 1660 bytes). Tambe´ s’ha de tenir en compte que els diferents
programes utilitzen diferents algoritmes de compressio´.
3.1.2. Late`ncia
Per analitzar la late`ncia dels diferentes programes es realitzen les mesures amb el pro-
grama ping. S’han realitzat 100 mesures en intervals de 2 segons per donar temps als
algoritmes del programari VPN.
1VPMN: Virtual Private Mesh Network
2ARP: Address Resolution Protocol
3ICMP: Internet Control Message Protocol
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3.1.3. Taxa ma`xima de transfere`ncia
Per analitzar la taxa ma`xima de transfere`ncia s’han realitzat els tests amb 2 programes
diferents: netperf i MGEN. El netperf s’ha utilitzat per realitzar tests en TCP i UDP, aquests
tests es realitzen enviant grans blocs d’informacio´ a trave´s dels protocols esmentats. El
MGEN s’ha utilitzat amb la configuracio´ de la taula 3.1 per tal d’enviar paquets a 737.28
Mbps durant 10 segons, i mesurant el nombre de paquets rebuts s’ha calculat la taxa
rebuda.
TXBUFFER 1000
0.0 ON 1 UDP DST 10.0.0.1/5000 PERIODIC [90000.0 996]
10.0 OFF 1
Taula 3.1: Configuracio´ MGEN
En la taula 3.1, la configuracio´ del MGEN utilitzada, encomana enviar 90000 paquets UDP
per segon amb un payload UDP de 996 bytes, resultant aixı´ paquets IP de 1024 bytes.
Per a calcular la taxa de recepcio´ s’utilitza l’equacio´ 3.1, tenint en compte que l’activitat
del MGEN es realitza nome´s durant 10 segons.
r = P · (996+28) ·8
10
(3.1)
r: Taxa de recepcio´ (bps). P: Nu´mero de paquets rebuts.
En interpretar els resultats obtinguts s’ha de tenir en compte la prese`ncia de la compressio´
durant els tests del programari VPN. Aquesta pot afectar a la comparativa de la taxa de
recepcio´ si el tra`fic generat te´ diferents ratis de compressio´ depenent dels algoritmes
utilitzats en cada programari.
La llibreria OpenSSL nome´s pot treballar amb un sol thread per connexio´, per tant la
utilitzacio´ de threads en l’aplicacio´ creada en aquest projecte (VPMN) nome´s es veuria
beneficiada en un context de va`ries connexions.
3.2. Ana`lisi de resultats
Abans d’analitzar els resultats cal comentar els problemes trobats durant les proves amb
el programa creat. Ja durant els primers tests d’aquesta aplicacio´ es van notar compor-
taments ano`mals amb la recepcio´ de tra`fic xifrat i s’ha invertit molt de temps en intentar
trobar l’arrel d’aquest problema. Per mirar de sol·lucionar-lo es va intentar canviar la part
que treballa amb el xifratge amb diferents algoritmes i estructures. Finalment, despre´s de
depurar molt el programa, s’ha pogut trobar que el comportament ano`mal ve donat per la
llibreria OpenSSL, que sembla que falla al cap d’un temps aleatori [16] malgrat aparent-
ment l’aplicacio´ fa un bon u´s d’ella. Per tant sembla que la recent implementacio´ de DTLS
d’aquesta llibreria conte´ errors que afecten a l’u´s que se’n fa en aquesta aplicacio´. S’ha
observat que aquests errors es produeixen me´s sovint quan transiten paquets de mides
diferents; i canviar l’algoritme de xifratge tambe´ canvia la forma de percebre l’error. El poc
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u´s que rep aquest protocol, i per tant la seva implementacio´ en la OpenSSL, fa que no
s’hagi pogut trobar documentat aquest possible error, pero` s’ha comenc¸at a buscar l’error
dins del codi font de la llibreria [16]. Per altre banda s’ha trobat una altre aplicacio´ (pro-
pieta`ria), que fa u´s del mateix protocol, pero` utilitza la llibreria OpenSSL modificada [17]
sense alliberar els canvis que hi han realitzat.
Com a consequ¨e`ncia dels problemes esmentats, els tests d’aquesta aplicacio´ s’han hagut
de realitzat nombroses vegades abans de poder obtenir un resultat.
Per analitzar els resultats cal tenir en compte que tal com s’ha descrit l’escenari, algunes
aplicacions tenen un comportament diferent:
• Les aplicacions utilitzen algoritmes de compressio´ i xifratge diferents.
• El OpenVPN no realitza tasques d’enrutament intern en el node client al haver-hi
una insta`ncia servidor i una client: tant el TincVPN com el VPMN realitzen aquestes
tasques en ambdo´s nodes.
• El TincVPN no intercanvia certificats ni claus pu´bliques; el seu protocol, tal com esta`
descrit en el capı´tol 1.1.3., no compleix tots els requisits per a ser un protocol segur.
En la taula 3.2 es compara l’eficie`ncia en el tra`fic. Es pot veure com el OpenVPN inter-
Mida (bytes)
Aplicacio´ Inicialitzacio´ Ping
directe 112 84
OpenVPN 11876 153
TincVPN 2569 136
VPMN 4641 169
Taula 3.2: Eficie`ncia
canvia notablement me´s informacio´ durant la inicialitzacio´, me´s del doble del tra`fic generat
pel VPMN. El TincVPN es mante´ per sota de les altres aplicacions, pero` aquest no inter-
canvia certificats durant la inicialitzacio´. Afegint un intercanvi de 2 certificats serien 4229
bytes i estaria a prop del VPMN pero` encara mantenint-se per sota; afegint els 2 certifi-
cats me´s, el de la CA de cada un, aquest hauria d’enviar 5889 bytes i es quedaria entre el
OpenVPN i el VPMN. Per tant es pot dir que TincVPN envia poca informacio´ d’inicialitzacio´
gra`cies a l’abse`ncia d’aquest intercanvi. La negociacio´ ARP de la connexio´ directe esta`
molt per sota de les inicialitzacions de les altres aplicacions, per tant com ja es podia pre-
dir el contingut que necessiten transportar els paquets ARP e´s molt menor al de qualsevol
negociacio´ de les aplicacions VPN.
Tambe´ e´s el TincVPN el que aconsegueix la millor eficie`ncia en la transfere`ncia dels pa-
quets ping. Les altres aplicacions resulten estar molt a prop d’aquest resultat pero` aquesta
vegada OpenVPN millora l’eficie`ncia al VPMN. En aquest test la mida original, mesurada
en la connexio´ directe, no s’allunya molt dels resultats dels paquets xifrats.
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En la taula 3.3 es compara la late`ncia mesurant el RTT4. La mı´nima late`ncia e´s la del
RTT (ms)
Aplicacio´ Pe`rdues Mı´nim Mitjana Ma`xim D.Esta`ndard
directe 0% 0.047 0.050 0.074 0.006
OpenVPN 0% 0.199 0.479 5.333 1.080
TincVPN 0% 0.136 0.185 0.911 0.092
VPMN 0% 0.228 0.310 0.415 0.034
Taula 3.3: Late`ncia
TincVPN i la ma`xima e´s la del OpenVPN. VPMN es mante´ entremig pero` amb una desvia-
cio´ esta`ndard molt inferior a la dels altres dos programaris. La desviacio´ esta`ndard major
e´s la de OpenVPN, i aquest tambe´ enregistra valors ma`xims molt elevats per estar en una
xarxa local. Els resultats de la late`ncia en connexio´ directe nome´s donen una refere`ncia
de que l’escenari utilitza una xarxa local.
En la taula 3.4 es compara la taxa ma`xima de transfere`ncia. L’aplicacio´ que arriba a la
Ma`xim (Mbps)
Aplicacio´ TCP UDP MGEN
directe 690.49 929.91 116.03
OpenVPN 185.01 500.37 78.52
TincVPN 133.26 270.77 78.29
VPMN 188.09 193.28 96.17
Taula 3.4: Taxa ma`xima de transfere`ncia
ma`xima taxa e´s la OpenVPN amb tra`fic UDP: e´s el valor me´s proper a la connexio´ directe
(nome´s superant lleugerament la meitat d’aquest valor). L’aplicacio´ TincVPN te´ valors molt
baixos en TCP. El programa creat en aquest projecte (VPMN), malgrat tenir un bon resultat
en TCP i MGEN, es mante´ en velocitats semblants tant en TCP com en UDP.
Per tant es pot observar com en treballar amb paquets grans els resultats so´n molt dife-
rents dels d’eficie`ncia. En aquest test pero` tambe´ s’hi veu representada l’eficie`ncia dels
algoritmes interns, de xifratge i d’enrutament (OpenVPN nome´s enruta en un node).
El test del MGEN al utilitzar UDP hauria de donar resultats semblants als del test de UDP
pero` en canvi do´na resultats ben diferents. Primerament no arriba a enviar els aproxima-
dament 740 Mbps, sino´ uns 116 Mbps. Per tant el programari esta` treballant en condicions
me´s normals de les de taxa ma`xima. Concloent, el resultat del test amb MGEN do´na uns
resultats estranys possiblement per la manera de mesurar la velocitat.
A continuacio´ es fa un resum de la seccio´. El OpenVPN realitza una inicialitzacio´ exten-
sa, te una late`ncia gran juntament amb una desviacio´ esta`ndard alta i permet taxes de
4RTT: Round-Trip Time
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transfere`ncia grans. El TincVPN realitza una inicialitzacio´ molt breu, te una late`ncia molt
baixa i permet taxes de transfere`ncia baixes. L’aplicacio´ creada realitza una inicialitzacio´
breu, te una late`ncia baixa juntament amb una desviacio´ esta`ndard molt baixa i permet
taxes de transfere`ncia altes en TCP i baixes en UDP (en comparacio´ amb les de les altres
aplicacions).
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CAPI´TOL 4. CONCLUSIONS
En el projecte s’ha dedicat molt de temps en trobar un protocol de seguretat tolerant a
pe`rdues, i per tant un protocol que permeti esquivar el problema ja esmentat de TCP dins
de TCP. En trobar DTLS i la seva implementacio´ en OpenSSL es va procedir a dissenyar
i implementar l’aplicacio´.
Me´s endavant el projecte es va veure endarrerit pel problema de la recent implementacio´
de DTLS d’aquesta llibreria. Tal com s’ha comentat, el poc u´s que rep aquest protocol i
la implementacio´ de OpenSSL, va fer que fos me´s difı´cil trobar documentat l’error. Aixo`
tambe´ ha fet que la dedicacio´ del projecte es centres me´s a solucionar aquest error, tant
dins de la aplicacio´ com en la llibreria, que en implementar totes les altres funcionalitats.
Per tant funcionalitats com la del temporitzador (explicat en la seccio´ 2.4.) o un interpret
pel fitxer de configuracio´ no han estat implementades, tot i que tota la estructura esta`
dissenyada i preparada per que hi acabin existint.
De les diferents eleccions que s’han pres durant el disseny del projecte es pot dir que
l’eleccio´ del protocol DTLS no ha estat un error, tal com s’ha vist amb els resultats dels
tests en l’anterior capı´tol. Tampoc e´s una mala decisio´ utilitzar el OpenSSL al ser la u´nica
implementacio´ de DTLS trobada. En canvi l’eleccio´ de realitzar el projecte amb threads ha
comportat una dedicacio´ molt me´s gran de la que s’hagi pogut apreciar en els resultats;
pero` tal com s’ha comentat, faltaria fer tests amb me´s nodes per veure el possible benefici
d’aquesta decisio´.
En un futur es prete´n deixar l’aplicacio´ operativa i oberta a la comunitat de programari
lliure. Per tant, arreglar l’error del codi font de la llibreria OpenSSL e´s una prioritat a curt
termini, aixı´ com tambe´ fer me´s usable l’aplicacio´ per l’usuari final.
Com a curiositat aquest projecte va ser presentat Summer Camp Garrotxa 2008 el dia 5 de
Juliol del 2008 a la poblacio´ de Sant Jaume de Llierca, i la presentacio´ va atraure al pu´blic
present deixant als interessats a les expectatives d’una aplicacio´ totalment funcional.
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ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol, 23
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force, 3
IP Internet Protocol (versio´ 4 o 6), 1
IPsec Internet Protocol security, 3
IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange, 7
LAN Local Area Network, 1
NAT Network Address Translator, 1
NAT-T NAT Traversal in the IKE, 4
OSI Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model, 4
P2P Peer to peer, 12
POSIX Portable Operating System Interface, 17
RFC Request for Comments from IETF, 3
RTT Round-Trip Time, 25
SSL Secure Socket Layer (la versio´ 3 en convertir-se en esta`ndard es va
anomenar TLS), 6
TCP Transmission Control Protocol, 6
TLS Transport Layer Security (per me´s informacio´ consultar l’annex C), 6
ToS Type of Service, 14
UDP User Datagram Protocol, 6
VPMN Virtual Private Mesh Network, 23
VPN Virtual Private Network, 1
XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol, 7
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Abstract
A number of applications have emerged over recent
years that use datagram transport. These applications
include real time video conferencing, Internet telephony,
and online games such as Quake and StarCraft. These ap-
plications are all delay sensitive and use unreliable data-
gram transport. Applications that are based on reliable
transport can be secured using TLS, but no compelling al-
ternative exists for securing datagram based applications.
In this paper we present DTLS, a datagram capable ver-
sion of TLS. DTLS is extremely similar to TLS and there-
fore allows reuse of pre-existing protocol infrastructure.
Our experimental results show that DTLS adds minimal
overhead to a previously non-DTLS capable application.
1. Introduction
TLS [7] is the most widely deployed protocol for se-
curing network traffic. TLS is used to protect Web traffic
(HTTP [9] [25]) and e-mail protocols such as IMAP [6]
and POP [23]. The primary advantage of TLS is that
it provides a secure, transparent channel; it is easy to
provide security for an application protocol by insert-
ing TLS between the application layer and the network
layer—where the session layer is in the OSI model. TLS,
however, requires a reliable transport channel—typically
TCP—and therefore cannot be used to secure datagram
traffic.
When TLS was developed, this limitation was not con-
sidered particularly serious because the vast majority of
applications then ran over TCP. While this is still largely
true today, the situation is changing. Over the past few
years an increasing number of application layer protocols,
such as Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [26], Real Time
Protocol (RTP) [28], the Media Gateway Control Protocol
(MGCP) [1], and a variety of gaming protocols have been
designed to use UDP transport.
Currently, designers of such applications are faced with
a number of unsatisfactory choices for providing security.
First, they can use IPsec [18]. However, IPsec is not well
suited for client-server application models and is difficult
to package with applications since it runs in the kernel.
Section 2.1 has a detailed discussion of why IPsec has
been found to be a less than satisfactory option. Second,
they can design a custom application layer security pro-
tocol. SIP, for instance, uses a variant of S/MIME [2] to
secure its traffic. Grafting S/MIME into SIP took vastly
more effort than did running the TCP variant of SIP over
TLS. Third, one can rehost the application on TCP and use
TLS. Unfortunately many such applications depend on
datagram semantics and have unacceptable performance
when run over a stream protocol such as TCP.
The obvious alternative is to design a generic channel
security protocol that will do for long lived applications
using datagram transport what TLS did for TCP. Such a
protocol could be implemented in user space for portabil-
ity and easy installation but would be flexible and generic
enough to provide security for a variety of datagram-
oriented applications. Despite initial concerns that this so-
lution would be a large and difficult design project, con-
structing a working protocol was fairly straightforward,
especially with TLS as a starting point and IPsec as a
reference. This paper describes the new protocol, which
we call “Datagram TLS”. DTLS is a modified version of
TLS that functions properly over datagram transport. This
approach has two major advantages over the alternatives.
First, since DTLS is very similar to TLS, preexisting pro-
tocol infrastructure and implementations can be reused.
To demonstrate, we implemented DTLS by adding to the
OpenSSL [30] library; in all, we added about 7000 lines
of code, about 60% of which were cut and pasted from
OpenSSL. Second, since DTLS provides a familiar inter-
face to a generic security layer, it is easy to adapt protocols
to use it. Experience with TLS has shown that this ease of
adaptation is a key to wide deployment.
The basic design principle of DTLS is “bang for the
buck.” We wished to minimize both our design and imple-
mentation effort and that of the designers and implemen-
tors who are potential DTLS users. Thus, in our design of
DTLS we choose not to include any features as “improve-
ments” over TLS; all the features additional to DTLS are
included for the sole purpose of dealing with unreliable
datagram traffic. This design point simplifies the security
analysis of DTLS.
2. Design Overview
The target applications for DTLS are primarily of the
client-server variety. These are the kinds of applications
for which TLS was designed and for which it works well.
The present security model of such applications is that the
server is authenticated by its DNS name and IP address but
the client is either anonymous or authenticates via some
form of credential, typically in the form of a username
and password handled by the application layer protocol.
This practice is not especially secure. However, appli-
cation protocol designers, want to maintain as much of
their protocol and implementation infrastructure as pos-
sible while adding security. This makes a channel secu-
rity protocol such as TLS or IPsec very attractive since
changes are minimized. From this perspective, ideally
a datagram channel security protocol would substitute
strong cryptographic authentication of the server for DNS
and IP-based authentication but leave client authentication
to the application layer protocol.
Our design is not the only possible one that can be used
in this scenario. In the following sections we consider
several alternative approaches and argue that they fit these
requirements less well than does DTLS.
2.1. Why not use IPsec?
IPsec was designed as a generic security mechanism for
Internet protocols. Unlike TLS, IPsec is a peer-to-peer
protocol. For many years IPsec was expected to be a suit-
able security protocol for datagram traffic generated by
client-server applications. In practice, however, there are
a number of problems with using IPsec for securing such
traffic. These problems stem directly from IPsec residing
at the network layer rather than the session or application
layer.
Review of IPsec architecture Unlike TLS, IPsec is
not one protocol but rather three: Authentication Header
(AH) [16] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [17]
are used for traffic security and Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) [12] is used for the establishment of keying material
and other traffic security parameters. These parameters
are collectively referred to as Security Association (SA).
In host implementations, AH and ESP are typically im-
plemented in the kernel as part of the IP stack, while IKE
is implemented as a user daemon. In network gateways
the architecture varies based on the device programming
model.
IPsec security policy is controlled using the Security
Policy Database (SPD). SPD entries can be created in two
ways. First, administrators can directly create entries in
the SPD. In addition, many host-based implementations
allow applications to set per-socket policies, for instance
using the PF_KEY API [20], thus allowing finer control
of policy.
When a socket is created in a host-based IPsec imple-
mentation, the SPD is consulted to determine the correct
security policy. If IPsec processing is required and an
appropriate SA does not exist, IKE is invoked to create
one. Future packets sent using that socket are protected
using that SA. In network gateway-based IPsec implemen-
tations the stack performs a SPD lookup for each outgoing
packet.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss several as-
pects of IPsec that make it less than ideal for the kind of
applications we are concerned with.
Server Authentication Client-server applications typi-
cally identify endpoints in terms of domain names. This
is the scenario for which TLS is optimized. In such an en-
vironment, the client has an identifier for the server, typ-
ically of the form of a DNS name or a URL. When the
client connects to the server, it wants the server to authen-
ticate using a credential that matches that identity.
IPsec security policies (as defined in the SPD) are usu-
ally expressed in terms of IP addresses, although there
is nominal support for symbolic names, including DNS
names. IKE supports use of symbolic names, including
DNS names in certificates analogous to TLS. However,
the primary motivation for support of these sorts of iden-
tifiers in IKE was for road warriors, whose IP address
could not be known in advance. Thus use of a DNS
name to securely identify a server, for example, is not
supported by most host IPsec implementations. In prin-
ciple, IPsec could provide verification by DNS name in
two ways. First, DNSSEC [8] could be used to securely
map the server’s DNS name to its IP address. However,
DNSSEC deployment has so far been minimal, making
this option problematic. Second, IPsec certificates could
contain DNS names and the client could use an IPsec API
to verify that the correct certificate was used. Unfortu-
nately, not all IPsec APIs allow certification information
to be determined and so this verification cannot be done
reliably or portably.
Residence in the kernel Because IPsec operates at the
IP layer, it generally must be implemented in the operating
system kernel, either directly compiled in or linked in as
a loadable module. This makes IPsec fairly inconvenient
to install on non-IPsec systems. This is no longer as large
a problem as it once was, since most modern operating
systems contain IPsec stacks. However, a large number of
legacy operating systems still are not IPsec-capable and
installing IPsec on them is generally a major operation.
A related problem is the lack of standardized IPsec
APIs. An IPsec using application which wishes to con-
trol keying policy has no way to portably do so. While
TLS APIs are not standardized either, an application de-
veloper can easily ship a TLS toolkit along with their ap-
plication, thus achieving portability. Increased developer
control does introduce the possibility that the developer
will use the toolkit insecurely. Developers have, however,
historically been willing to bear this risk.
2.2. Key Exchange over TCP?
Key negotiation over an unreliable connection is more
complicated than with a reliable connection. One alter-
native is to complete key negotiation on a TCP connec-
tion and use the negotiated parameters to secure a sepa-
rate datagram channel. This split design is similar to that
used by IPsec but has a number of problems.
The primary virtue of a split design is that it releases
DTLS from having to implement a reliable handshake
layer. In exchange, an application must now manage two
sockets (one TCP, and one UDP). Synchronizing these
sockets is a significant application programming problem.
In particular, session renegotiation is complicated by this
architecture. With the TCP connection closed once key
negotiation is complete, renegotiation messages must be
communicated over the unreliable datagram channel, re-
quiring the implementation of a retransmission mecha-
nism.
If the TCP connection is left open once key negotiation
is complete, unnecessary system resources are consumed.
This is a problem because operating system kernels often
exhibit problems when programs have a large numbers of
sockets open [14]. In particular, select() performs poorly
(if at all) with large numbers of open sockets and replace-
ments are often not portable. In addition, some older oper-
ating systems have tight limits on the number of open files
per process (in older Linux kernels this limit was 1024.)
An ordinary UDP server expects to read and write on
only a single socket. Thus, the use of a TCP handshake
channel could force significant rewriting of server code.
Additionally, error case handling becomes complicated:
say the TCP connection is reset, does that imply that the
bulk transfer channel should be closed?
These considerations lead us to conclude that it is bet-
ter to have the handshake and data transfer occur over
the same channel from the beginning. As we shall see,
DTLS’s reliability requirements are quite primitive, al-
lowing us to make do with a protocol much simpler than
TCP.
2.3. Design Requirements
Once we decided on a user-space protocol that runs
over a single channel, the direct course of action was to
make TLS datagram capable. Although DTLS must be
somewhat different from TLS, in keeping with our basic
principle we have kept TLS unchanged wherever possi-
ble. Where we have had to make changes to TLS, we
have attempted to borrow from preexisting systems such
as IPsec. Similarly, DTLS is explicitly designed to be as
compatible as possible with existing datagram communi-
cation systems, thus minimizing the effort required to se-
cure one’s application.
Datagram Transport DTLS must be able to complete
key negotiation and bulk data transfer over a single data-
gram channel. This property allows applications to sim-
ply replace each datagram socket with a secure datagram
socket managed by DTLS.
Reliable Session Establishment DTLS must provide a
mechanism for authenticating endpoints, reliably estab-
lishing keying material and negotiating algorithms and pa-
rameters. Since DTLS must run entirely over unreliable
datagram transport, it must implement a retransmission
mechanism for ensuring that handshake messages are re-
liably delivered. However, the retransmission mechanism
should be simple and lightweight, ensuring that DTLS is
as portable as possible. Note that the requirement to create
a session means that DTLS is primarily suited for long-
lived “connection-oriented” protocols as opposed to to-
tally connectionless ones like DNS. Connectionless proto-
cols are better served by application layer object-security
protocols.
Security Services DTLS must provide confidentiality
and integrity for the data transmitted over it. It should
optionally provide the ability to detect replayed packets.
Ease of Deployment The ability to implement TLS en-
tirely in user space without changing the kernel has been a
major contributor to TLS deployment. This feature allows
developers to bundle a TLS implementation with their ap-
plication without dependence on operating system ven-
dors. DTLS should similarly be implementable solely in
user space.
Semantics For many TCP based applications it has been
very simple to implement a security layer by using TLS.
One of the main reasons is that TLS semantics mimic
those of TCP. Thus, a TLS API can mimic the well known
socket interface, making network connections appear to
be read-write streams. DTLS semantics should mimic
UDP semantics thus allowing DTLS implementations to
mimic the UDP API.
Minimal Changes DTLS must be as similar to TLS as
possible. Over the years, TLS has become more robust
and has been refined to withstand numerous attacks. Our
goal is for DTLS to be equally robust by inheriting all
the tested and popular features of TLS. By minimizing
changes we reduce the likelihood of introducing any un-
foreseen weaknesses.
Additionally, minimizing changes has the benefit that
DTLS can be easily implemented based on TLS imple-
mentations such as OpenSSL [30]. Hardware implemen-
tations of TLS are optimized to speed up asymmetric and
symmetric cryptographic operations. DTLS should not
introduce new cipher suites or make changes to the key
derivation algorithms. Hence DTLS implementations can
leverage hardware implementations of TLS.
2.4. Non-Requirements
DTLS is not intended to provide any congestion control
functionality. Congestion control needs to be addressed
by a datagram transport using application regardless of
whether a security layer is in place, and hence is beyond
the scope of DTLS. Applications that do not implement
congestion control can use the Datagram Congestion Con-
trol Protocol (DCCP) [19] as the underlying transport pro-
tocol with DTLS providing the security layer.
3. TLS Overview
Since DTLS is based on TLS, it is useful for the reader
to be familiar with TLS. In this section we provide a brief
overview of TLS.
3.1. TLS Features
TLS is a generic application layer security protocol that
runs over reliable transport. It provides a secure channel
to application protocol clients. This channel has three pri-
mary security features:
1. Authentication of the server.
2. Confidentiality of the communication channel.
3. Message integrity of the communication channel.
Optionally TLS can also provide authentication of the
client.
In general, TLS authentication uses public key based
digital signatures backed by certificates. Thus, the server
authenticates either by decrypting a secret encrypted un-
der his public key or by signing an ephemeral public key.
The client authenticates by signing a random challenge.
Server certificates typically contain the server’s domain
name. Client certificates can contain arbitrary identities.
3.2. Protocol
TLS is a layered protocol consisting of four pieces,
shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The Structure of TLS
At the bottom is the TLS Record Layer which handles
all data transport. The record layer is assumed to sit di-
rectly on top of some reliable transport such as TCP. The
record layer can carry four kinds of payloads:
1. Handshake messages—used for algorithm negotia-
tion and key establishment.
2. ChangeCipherSpec messages—really part of the
handshake but technically a separate kind of mes-
sage.
3. Alert messages—used to signal that errors have oc-
curred
4. Application layer data
We focus on describing the record and handshake layers
since they are of the most relevance to DTLS.
3.3. Record Protocol
The TLS record protocol is a simple framing layer with
record format as shown below (see RFC 2246 [7] for a
description of the specification language):
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
opaque payload[length];
} TLSRecord;
Each record is separately encrypted and MACed. In or-
der to prevent reordering and replay attacks a sequence
number is incorporated into the MAC but is not carried
in the record itself. Since records are delivered using a
reliable transport, the sequence number of a record can
be obtained simply by counting the records seen. Simi-
larly, encryption state (CBC residues or RC4 keystream)
ClientHello −−−−−−→
ServerHello
Certificate
←−−−−−− ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished −−−−−−→
[ChangeCipherSpec]
←−−−−−− Finished
Figure 2. The simple RSA TLS handshake
is chained between records. Thus, a record cannot be
independently decrypted if for some reason the previous
record is lost.
3.4. Handshake Protocol
The TLS handshake is a conventional two round-trip al-
gorithm negotiation and key establishment protocol. For
illustration, we show the most common RSA-based vari-
ant of the handshake in Figure 2.
A TLS client initiates the handshake by sending the
ClientHello message. This message contains the TLS ver-
sion, a list of algorithms and compression methods that
the client will accept and a random nonce used for anti-
replay.
The server responds with three messages. The Server-
Hello contains the server’s choice of version and algo-
rithms and a random nonce. The Certificate contains the
server’s certificate chain. The ServerHelloDone is sim-
ply a marker message to indicate that no other messages
are forthcoming. In more complicated handshakes other
messages would appear between the Certificate and the
ServerHelloDone messages.
The client then chooses a random PreMasterSecret
which will be used as the basis for each side’s keying ma-
terial. The client encrypts the PreMasterSecret under the
server’s RSA public key and sends it to the server in the
ClientKeyExchange message. The client then sends the
ChangeCipherSpec message to indicate that it is chang-
ing to the newly negotiated protection suite. Finally, the
client sends the Finished message which contains a MAC
of the previous handshake messages. Note that the Fin-
ished message is encrypted under the new protection suite.
The server responds with its own ChangeCipherSpec and
Finished messages.
As with the record layer, the handshake protocol as-
sumes that data is carried over reliable transport. The or-
der of the messages is precisely defined and each message
depends on previous messages. Any other order is an error
and results in protocol failure. In addition, no mechanism
is provided for handling message loss. Retransmission in
case of loss must be handled by the transport layer.
4. DTLS Design
DTLS reuses almost all the protocol elements of TLS,
with minor but important modifications for it to work
properly with datagram transport. TLS depends on a sub-
set of TCP features: reliable, in-order packet delivery and
replay detection. Unfortunately, all of these features are
absent from datagram transport. In this section we de-
scribe the DTLS protocol and how it copes with the ab-
sence of these features. Note that although we believe that
IPsec is the wrong tool for providing this type of security,
many of its techniques for handling these effects are quite
useful and are borrowed for DTLS.
4.1. Record Layer
As with TLS, all DTLS data is carried in records. In
both protocols, records can only be processed when the
entire record is available. In order to avoid dealing with
fragmentation, we require DTLS records to fit within a
single datagram. There are three benefits to this require-
ment. First, since the DTLS layer does not need to buffer
partial records, host memory can be used more efficiently,
which makes the host less susceptible to a DoS attack.
Second, it is quite possible that datagrams carrying the
remaining record fragments are lost, in which case the
received fragments are useless and cannot be processed.
Third, it is not clear how long received fragments should
be buffered before being discarded. Buffering record frag-
ments would unnecessarily complicate a DTLS imple-
mentation without providing any obvious benefits. Note
that DTLS will still operate correctly with IP fragmenta-
tion and re-assembly, since IP re-assembly is transparently
handled by the kernel.
The DTLS record format is shown below. The boxed
fields are introduced by DTLS and are absent from TLS
records.
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 epoch;
uint48 sequence_number;
uint16 length;
opaque payload[length];
} DTLSRecord;
Epoch Epoch numbers are used by endpoints to de-
termine which cipher state has been used to protect the
record payload. Epoch numbers are required to resolve
ambiguity that arises when data loss occurs during a ses-
sion renegotiation. To illustrate, consider a client trans-
mitting data records 7, 8 and 9, followed by ChangeCi-
pherSpec message in record 10. Suppose the server re-
ceives records 7 and 9 (8 and 10 are lost). From the
server’s point of view, record 8 could have been the
ChangeCipherSpec message, in which case record 9 is
(incorrectly) assumed to be associated with the pending
cipher state. Since epoch numbers are incremented upon
sending a ChangeCipherSpec message, the server can use
the epoch number to resolve the ambiguity. In this case,
records 7 and 9 have the same epoch, implying that record
8 must have been a data record.
An alternative to epoch numbers would be to simply
use random initial sequence numbers for records. The se-
quence numbers are sufficiently large that the chance of
collision of active sequence number ranges is vanishingly
small. However, this would probably require slightly
more code to implement than the epoch strategy and is
less in keeping with the style of TLS, which uses zero-
based sequence numbers.
Sequence Number TLS employs implicit record se-
quence numbers (RSN) for replay protection. RSNs play
a similar role in DTLS, but must be explicitly specified
since records can get lost or be delivered out of order. As
with TLS, RSNs are incremented by 1 for each record and
are reset to zero whenever the cipher state is rolled over
due to a session renegotiation. Note that DTLS sequence
numbers are 48 bits (TLS’s are 64 bits) and therefore the
total space occupied by epoch and sequence number is the
same as the sequence number in TLS.
Replay detection is performed using the replay window
mechanism of RFC 2401 [18]. If datagrams always ar-
rived in order, it would be sufficient for a DTLS end point
to keep track of the most recent record seen in order to
detect replays. But since datagrams may also arrive out
of order, a replay window mechanism is required. This
is most easily implemented as a bitmap where the set bits
represent the most recently received records. RSNs that
are too old to be checked against the bitmap are discarded.
Note, however, that replay detection can be undesirable
in some applications since packet duplication may be an
unintentional network effect. If replay detection is turned
off, then sequence numbers are not of any significance in
MAC computation, but can be useful for counter mode
ciphers.
Payload Length DTLS requires that a record fit entirely
within a single datagram. This means that DTLS records
will often be smaller than TLS records. The largest packet
that can be transmitted between two hosts—the Path Max-
imum Transmission Unit (PMTU)—is typically less than
the maximum size of a TLS record.
4.2. Ciphering Modes
DTLS cannot use any of the TLS 1.0 cipher modes,
since they all maintain residual state between records re-
quiring records to be processed in order without loss.
However, the CBC mode proposed for TLS 1.1 is com-
patible with DTLS, as we describe in this section. We
also explain why RC4 is unsuitable for use in DTLS.
DTLS can also make use of counter mode AES, once
this mode has been standardized.
CBC Mode An attack [31] against CBC mode ciphers
as employed by TLS 1.0 has resulted in the use of a
slightly modified version of CBC that requires explicit ini-
tialization vectors (IVs). The new version is likely to be a
feature of TLS 1.1 and is well suited for use in DTLS.
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Figure 3. CBC Encryption with Explicit IV
As shown above, in explicit IV mode a random data
block is prepended to record data. All the encrypted
blocks are transmitted, and the receiver simply discards
the first plaintext block to retrieve record data. With an ex-
plicit IV, each record can be separately decrypted. Triple-
DES and AES can be used with DTLS in this mode.
RC4 RC4 has been the cipher of choice for securing
TLS 1.0 connections due to its computational efficiency.
Unfortunately, RC4 is not easily applied to lossy datagram
traffic: random access implies that the key stream needs
to be buffered. Alternatively, the RC4 engine can be re-
seeded for each incoming record, which is also fairly inef-
ficient especially considering that work by Mironov [21]
recommends that the first 512 bytes of RC4 keystream be
discarded due to a weakness in the RC4 key scheduling
algorithm [10].
We conclude that RC4 is an unsuitable cipher for use in
DTLS.
4.3. Handshake Protocol
The DTLS handshake, shown in Figure 4, is nearly
identical to that of TLS. There are two major changes:
1. Stateless cookie exchange to prevent denial of ser-
vice.
2. Message fragmentation and re-assembly
We begin by describing the modifications to protect the
handshake exchange from denial of service.
Handshake Exchange Because the DTLS handshake
takes place over datagram transport, it is vulnerable to
two denial of service attacks that TLS is not. The first
attack is the standard resource consumption attack. The
second attack is an amplification attack where the attacker
sends a ClientHello message apparently sourced by the vic-
tim. The server then sends a Certificate message—which
is much larger—to the victim.
To mitigate these attacks, DTLS uses the cookie ex-
change technique that has been used in protocols such as
Photuris [13]. Before the handshake proper begins, the
client must replay a “cookie” provided by the server in or-
der to demonstrate that it is capable of receiving packets
at its claimed IP address.
Figure 4 shows the DTLS protocol.
ClientHello −−−−−−→
←−−−−−− HelloVerifyRequest
ClientHello −−−−−−→
ServerHello
Certificate
←−−−−−− ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished −−−−−−→
[ChangeCipherSpec]
←−−−−−− Finished
Figure 4. The simple DTLS RSA handshake
The DTLS ClientHello message contains a cookie field.
The initial ClientHello contains an empty (zero-length)
cookie or potentially one cached from a prior exchange.
A server that is unable to verify the incoming cookie and
wishes to establish the liveness of the DTLS client sends
a HelloVerifyRequest message. Servers that are more sen-
sitive to overall handshake latency can skip the HelloVeri-
fyRequest message and instead respond with ServerHello
messages, in which case the protocol flow is the same as
in TLS. Note that servers which choose to make this op-
timization can still be used as denial of service amplifiers
and should therefore only do so in environments where
amplification attack is known not to be a problem.
The HelloVerifyRequest message contains a cookie.
This cookie should be generated in such a way that it
does not require keeping state on the server, thus avoid-
ing memory consumption denial of service attacks. For
example, the cookie can be generated from a keyed hash
of the client IP address, using a global key. Techniques for
generating and verifying this kind of stateless cookie are
well known, see for instance Photuris [13].
Servers that are willing to resume sessions can skip the
cookie exchange phase if a valid session ID is presented
by the client, since the identity of the client must have
been previously established. One possible optimization
for servers that do not support session resumption is to
maintain a cache of recent (client, cookie) pairs, so that
cookie exchange can be skipped if a match is made on the
first ClientHello .
The formats of the ClientHello and HelloVerifyRequest
messages are provided below.
opaque Cookie<0..32>;
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
Random random;
SessionID session_id;
Cookie cookie;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
CompressionMethod comp_meth<1..2^8-1>;
} ClientHello;
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Cookie cookie;
} HelloVerifyRequest;
Unlike application data, handshake messages (including
the ChangeCipherSpec message) must be reliably deliv-
ered since all handshake messages are necessary for suc-
cessful session negotiation. This creates three problems.
First, messages may be lost on the network. Second, they
may be reordered, confusing the receiving peer. Third,
some handshake messages are too large to fit in a sin-
gle DTLS record and therefore must be fragmented across
multiple records. The DTLS handshake layer is responsi-
ble for reassembling these records into a coherent stream
of complete handshake messages. This necessitates the
addition of retransmission as well as a more complicated
message format.
4.4. Timeout and Retransmission
Because DTLS handshake messages may be lost,
DTLS needs a mechanism for retransmission. DTLS im-
plements retransmission using a single timer at each end-
point. Each end-point keeps retransmitting its last mes-
sage until a reply is received. The state machine that im-
plements the timer and resulting retransmissions is shown
in Figure 5. In the balance of this section, we describe
the operation of the timer state machine and explain how
timer expiry values are picked.
State Machine Once in the Read Message Fragment
state, transitions are triggered by the arrival of data frag-
ments or the expiry of the retransmission timer. If a data
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Figure 5. Timer state machine
fragment is the expected next handshake message then the
fragment is returned to the higher layers and the timer
is cancelled. Otherwise, the fragment is buffered or dis-
carded as appropriate and the timer is allowed to continue
ticking. When the retransmit timer expires, the implemen-
tation retransmits the last flight of messages that it trans-
mitted.
Timer Values Picking appropriate timer values is a dif-
ficult problem due to the heterogeneous nature of the In-
ternet and the wide variance in round trip times (RTT).
While estimating RTT would allow for estimating a timer
value, requiring that DTLS estimate RTT is an unneces-
sary burden, given the simplicity of the handshake pro-
tocol. Deciding on the exact timer value is especially
tricky because the peer is often doing some kind of cryp-
tographic computation, which can take a substantial frac-
tion of the RTT. Thus, one wishes to set one’s timer values
conservatively to avoid unnecessary retransmissions.
We recommend that DTLS implementations use timer
values between 500 to 1000ms. In general, well-behaving
implementations should back off their retransmission
timers.
Are ACKs necessary? When a retransmission event
happens, the entire flight of un-answered messages is re-
transmitted. If that flight is large, like a Certificate mes-
sage, a nontrivial amount of network bandwidth (though
probably less than 5k) is wasted. In addition, the desire
to avoid unnecessary retransmission motivates large timer
values which result in high latency. An alternative strategy
would be to allow receivers to transmit an ACK value that
indicated that they have received the message and were
processing it. This would allow timers to be set lower
as well as reducing the number of packets that have to
be retransmitted (since the sender would know that some
had already been received.) In the interest of simplicity,
we decided not to add an ACK feature to DTLS, but fu-
ture measurement may indicate that ACKs provide a large
enough improvement to be worthwhile adding.
4.5. Handshake Message Ordering and Fragmen-
tation
Because handshake messages may be too large to fit into
a single DTLS record, we need to modify the handshake
messages to be able to span records. The new format is
shown below.
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type;
uint24 length;
uint16 message_seq;
uint24 frag_offset;
uint24 frag_length;
HandshakeMessage msg_frag[frag_length];
} Handshake;
Message Length The handshake message header con-
tains the overall message length. This makes it easy to
allocate buffer space for the message regardless of which
fragment is received first.
Message Sequence Number Handshake (and Change
Cipher Spec) messages include their own message se-
quence numbers (MSN), independent of record sequence
numbers (RSN). Since the record layer assigns unique se-
quence numbers to each record, it is possible that a DTLS
end-point receives a handshake message and its retrans-
mitted version under different RSNs. In the absence of the
MSN, it is not possible for the handshake layer to detect
duplicates. All fragments of a handshake message carry
the same MSN.
It is worthwhile considering whether retransmits can
reuse the original RSN, and hence make do without the
MSN. As it turns out, there are two problems with reusing
RSNs. First, it is a layering violation: the handshake layer
is a client of the record layer, just like the application
layer, and should not receive different treatment. Second,
the original handshake message may have been dropped
due to the packet size exceeding PMTU. In this case the
handshake message needs to be fragmented, which im-
plies that it spans multiple records, each with their own
unique RSN.
Fragment Offset and Length As previously men-
tioned, handshake messages may be fragmented when
they are larger than PMTU. In fact such fragmentation
is fairly likely since certificates can easily be a couple of
kilobytes in size. We chose to use fragment offset and
length rather than fragment sequence numbers to aid in
handling messages which are fragmented twice in two dif-
ferent ways. With this scheme, it is easy to reassemble the
original message provided at least one copy of each byte
is received.
Finished Message The purpose of Finished messages is
to verify that parties have correctly negotiated keys and
algorithms. In TLS, the Finished message contains MD5
and SHA1 hashes of all the handshake messages, sequen-
tially appended to each other (including their message
headers). The DTLS algorithm for computing finished
hashes has to be slightly different due to the presence of
message fragmentation headers. Since the message might
have been fragmented multiple times with different frag-
ment sizes, this creates a potential inconsistency. In or-
der to remove this inconsistency, the handshake hashes are
computed as if handshake messages had been received as
a single fragment.
Alert Messages DTLS reuses all of the TLS alerts.
Most TLS alerts signal the end of the connection–either
graceful or abortive–and therefore no data should come
after them. Under no circumstances should a record be
accepted with a sequence number postdating that of an
alert which closed the connection.
There is, however, a complication introduced by a
sender transmitting data followed by an alert but have
them arrive in the reverse order. We have not analyzed
this situation, but believe that it is safer for implementa-
tions to reject such data records.
5. Security Analysis
Considering the complexity of modern security pro-
tocols and the current state of proof techniques, it is
rarely possible to completely prove the security of a proto-
col without making at least some unrealistic assumptions
about the attack model.
Instead of attempting to rigorously prove the security of
DTLS, one of our main goals in the design of DTLS is
to follow the TLS specification as closely as possible. As
a result, DTLS does not offer any “improvements” over
TLS. All the features introduced into DTLS are for the
sole purpose of dealing with unreliable datagram trans-
port.
We argue that DTLS does not reveal any additional
information beyond TLS during the handshake or bulk
transfer phase—all the additional information in a DTLS
stream can be derived by passively monitoring a TLS
stream. To justify this argument, consider the additional
information that is available from a DTLS stream.
Record Layer The DTLS record layer reveals the cur-
rent epoch and sequence number. This is public informa-
tion to an adversary monitoring a TLS session: the se-
quence numbers are implicit in TLS, but nonetheless may
be inferred, and epoch numbers may also be derived from
the stream since session renegotiations may be detected
(by observing Handshake records being exchanged during
an established session.)
Handshake Layer Handshake messages reveal mes-
sage number, fragment length and fragment offset. Once
again, this information is easily derived by an eavesdrop-
per monitoring a TLS session. Message number is ob-
tained by counting exchanged messages, fragment length
is obtained from record length and fragment offset is de-
rived from the length of preceding message fragments.
Only the Finished message is encrypted during the ini-
tial handshake phase, and since it is of a fixed format, its
fragment length and offset are obvious.
Handshake messages exchanged due to session renego-
tiation are completely encrypted in both DTLS and TLS.
Timing information Recently, timing information has
been used as the basis for attacks on TLS [4][5]. Therefore
it is critical to consider what information is revealed by
timing.
DTLS receive record processing is essentially the same
as that of TLS. On reception, records and handshake mes-
sages are not processed until available in entirety, and
therefore the processing of DTLS records and messages
is identical to the processing procedure of TLS.
DTLS transmit processing leaks a small amount of tim-
ing information when compared to TLS. In general, when
applications issue TLS or DTLS writes, this causes a sin-
gle DTLS/TLS record to be generated. The time when
the packet is delivered to the network potentially reveals
information about the plaintext [29]. With TLS, TCP con-
gestion and flow control hides this information to some
extent, especially if the Nagle algorithm [24] is used. With
DTLS, however, records are likely to be transmitted as
soon as they are generated. Users who wish to prevent
this kind of traffic analysis should buffer writes.
Implementation We implemented DTLS based on the
OpenSSL toolkit and reuse much of the code already used
in production TLS servers. As a result, DTLS inherits well
tested and stable code.
6. Implementation
We implemented DTLS based on the popular OpenSSL
library [30]. OpenSSL is the de facto standard open source
TLS/SSL implementation. Additionally, OpenSSL has
proven to be stable and is used by numerous production
quality servers such as the Apache Web server.
We modified the demo server and client applications
that are part of the OpenSSL distribution to be UDP capa-
ble. We also implemented a UDP proxy application that
is capable of dropping, delaying and duplicating packets.
Results from our experiments are listed in Section 8. Our
implementation was tested and run on the Linux 2.4.21
kernel.
Our implementation required adding about 7000 lines
of additional code to the OpenSSL base distribution.
Considering that this line count includes libraries, data
structures and socket management needed for DTLS, our
code makes up only a small portion of the 240,000 line
OpenSSL package. Conveniently, we were able to lever-
age a number of OpenSSL features that were designed
for different use. For example, OpenSSL provides an I/O
buffering layer that causes TLS to only make send()
system calls when it has serialized all data to be sent on
a particular round of the handshake. We are able to reuse
the buffering code to maximize handshake packet payload
size.
In the remainder of this section we describe some de-
tails of our implementation.
OpenSSL Architecture OpenSSL implements SSLv2,
SSLv3 and TLSv1. Each of these protocols are imple-
mented by sharing as much code as possible, with vir-
tual functions handling protocol differences. From the li-
brary’s standpoint, DTLS appears to be another version of
the TLS protocol.
As a result of implementing DTLS in this way,
we can reuse much of the utility, state machine and
record/message generation code of OpenSSL. In a num-
ber of cases we found it was inconvenient to write spe-
cial cases into TLS processing code, and as a result we
copied many functions and modified them appropriately.
Roughly 60% of the 7000 lines of additional code were
actually copied from the other protocol implementations
in OpenSSL. With some effort it should be possible to re-
duce the amount of duplicated code substantially.
One of the nice side effects of implementing DTLS
this way is that DTLS can be accessed through the same
functions used by TLS, for example SSL_connect(),
SSL_read(), SSL_write() and, SSL_close().
Below we describe some issues encountered in our im-
plementation.
PMTU Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) is
the maximum sized packet that can travel on a path with-
out requiring fragmentation. In general, paths consist of
heterogeneous networks that have links with varying lim-
its on maximum packet size. Therefore the PMTU for a
given path is set by the limiting link on the path. Previous
work [15] shows that fragmentation is undesirable. Frag-
mentation results in inefficient use of network and rout-
ing resources, and lost fragments cause degraded perfor-
mance. Additionally, IP fragments interact poorly with
firewalls and NAT devices, which often discard fragments.
Therefore it is useful to know the PMTU.
RFC 1191 [22] specifies the process by which PMTU is
discovered. In short, hosts send out IP packets with the DF
(Don’t Fragment) bit set, iteratively reducing the size of
packets until the host is reached. Therefore, it is difficult
for the kernel to know a priori what the appropriate PMTU
is without incurring a significant probing cost–though it
can guess it after enough traffic has been transmitted. In
general, kernel support for PMTU is quite poor. On the
Linux system, where we developed our implementation,
the kernel keeps track of its PMTU estimate and returns
an error if an application attempts to send a larger packet.
DTLS needs to be agnostic about such kernel behav-
ior so as to not get caught using an excessive PMTU
value. Unless an application explicitly sets a PMTU
value we turn on the DF bit in outgoing datagrams via
setsockopt() and query the kernel for the MTU. If
the PMTU is unavailable, we guess a PMTU starting
with 1500 (the ethernet MTU), successively reducing the
PMTU estimate if the current setting happens to be too
large. We can detect that PMTU has been exceeded if
send() returns -1 and sets errno to EMSGSIZE.
On some operating systems, even this level of
PMTU support is unavailable and the only feedback that
the PMTU has been exceeded is packet loss. It’s not clear
what the best approach for dealing with such an environ-
ment is, but our intention is to start with a large packet size
and then back off the packet size with each successive re-
transmit.
Note however, that performance sensitive datagram ap-
plications are generally PMTU aware anyway, in which
case DTLS can be relieved of having to guess PMTU.
During the handshake phase, DTLS attempts to send the
largest packets possible, which includes packing multiple
records into a single packet.
Buffering Because retransmits may be necessary, we
buffer a copy of outbound handshake messages. Option-
ally, handshake messages may be reconstructed whenever
a retransmit request is received, but this is unnecessarily
computation intensive, especially when memory is avail-
able. Buffered messages need only be buffered until the
next expected handshake message is received. This is be-
cause the handshake protocol is executed in lock-step and
the incoming message provides an implicit acknowledg-
ment for all the buffered messages. Our implementation
of DTLS also buffers out-of-order handshake messages,
since the handshake layer expects messages to be deliv-
ered in order.
Retransmit Timer Our implementation uses a timer
value of 750ms, which is more than sufficient given that
our experiments were run on a LAN. When using block-
ing sockets, the timeout (set via setsockopt()) causes
recv() to return with an explicit timeout error if data is
not received during the time period. While we chose a
value suitable to our environment, our DTLS API allows
applications to set their own read and write timeout val-
ues.
Sockets that run in non-blocking mode cause DTLS to
return either SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE which are effectively
equivalent to EAGAIN, signalling that data was not im-
mediately available for reading or writing (this is the same
behavior as the TLS API). Non-blocking DTLS appli-
cations are required to call DTLS1_get_timeout()
to determine when the next DTLS I/O call should be
invoked and use their own timers to arrange for the call at
that time.
7. Programmer Experience
The DTLS API is very similar to the API provided by
OpenSSL for operating TLS connections. The only ad-
ditional calls provided by DTLS are related to datagram
transport: setting and getting PMTU, timer values and
datagram socket connection options. For testing purposes,
we ported the s_server and s_client programs that
are part of the OpenSSL distribution to use DTLS. Almost
all the effort required to port these applications to DTLS
was concentrated on making them UDP-capable.
At a high level, one can take an ordinary UDP ap-
plication and render it DTLS-capable by simply replac-
ing all calls to send() and recv() with calls to
SSL_write() and SSL_read(), the default I/O calls
of the OpenSSL library. As with OpenSSL’s ordinary be-
havior, the first call to the read or write functions attempts
to negotiate a DTLS connection. This simple approach
works well for applications which use a blocking I/O dis-
cipline but does not work well for those which want to op-
erate in non-blocking mode. Thus, applications that wish
to have a more complicated I/O control discipline need to
either use threads or non-blocking mode.
Thread-based I/O discipline In case of threaded appli-
cations, calls to the DTLS library are blocking, and the
library is fully responsible for handling timer expiry and
dispatching retransmits. Thus, the application can essen-
tially be oblivious to DTLS being in use, provided that it
uses a separate thread for each DTLS “connection.”
One consequence of protocol logic being abstracted
from applications is a slight break from blocking-socket
convention. In the case of blocking datagram sockets,
recv() either returns -1 on error, or a non-zero number
of bytes read. However, SSL_read() can return 0. This
happens when the data available on the incoming socket
is not application data, but control information, an Alert
message for example. This behavior of SSL_read() in-
terface is not specific to DTLS. The TLS programmer has
a similar experience when using OpenSSL.
Non-blocking I/O discipline When DTLS is used in
the context of a non-blocking event driven application,
the application needs to be prepared for timeouts dur-
ing handshake processing. Effectively, any I/O call to
DTLS can return with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE, signalling that an I/O op-
eration blocked. An application receiving such an error
needs to determine the current DTLS timeout by calling
DTLS1_get_timeout() and restart the I/O call when
the timer expires. Once the handshake is complete, DTLS
returns a value of 0 for the timer, signalling that it does
not have any pending I/O events. For simplicity, applica-
tions may choose to call DTLS1_get_timeout() re-
gardless of whether the handshake is in progress.
8. Experiments and Results
Our results from comparing network traffic gen-
erated by TLS and DTLS are listed in Tables 1
and 2. The cipher negotiated in these tests was
EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA. This cipher results in a to-
tal of 10 records being exchanged between client and
server for TLS. The DTLS negotiation had at least two
more records due to the cookie exchange phase and the
rest due to message fragmentation.
Each DTLS handshake message fragment has 25 bytes
of overhead from headers (13 for record header and 12 for
message fragment), compared to 9 bytes for TLS. In all,
the headers contribute to most of the overhead in DTLS
(the remainder comes from the the extra padding block
required by CBC with explicit IV). Even though the over-
head for DTLS is close to 35%, the actual size of the over-
head is quite small, since even exchanges with large cer-
tificates generate less than 3 KB of data. It should also
be noted that the results provided are only for the hand-
shake phase; overhead for data records is lower due to the
absence of the fragment header.
DTLS TLS
Packets Bytes Packets Bytes
Client 3 446 2 228
Server 3 1015 2 857
Total 6 1461 4 1085
Table 1. Bytes and Packets transferred with PMTU
1500, Certificate size 562 bytes
DTLS TLS
Packets Bytes Packets Bytes
Client 3 446 2 228
Server 4 2313 3 2105
Total 7 2759 5 2333
Table 2. Bytes and Packets transferred with PMTU
1500, Certificate size 1671 bytes
8.1. Latency
We measured latency of the TLS and DTLS handshakes
on a local machine. DTLS and TLS handshakes took
42.9 ms and 41.5 ms respectively. The difference between
these results is small due to the negligible RTT. In order
to differentiate the two protocols, we introduced a 150 ms
delay element, after which the DTLS handshake took 927
ms and the TLS handshake took 627 ms. This is exactly
as expected, since DTLS results include one extra RTT for
cookie exchange. Our measurements do not include the
time taken for TCP connection establishment. Since ses-
sion establishment requires a minimum of one RTT, this
virtually eliminates the latency difference.
9. Related Work
9.1. IPsec
The design of DTLS is probably closest to that of IPsec.
A number of the techniques that we used to make DTLS
records safe for datagram transport were borrowed from
IPsec. However, DTLS differs from IPsec in two impor-
tant respects. First, DTLS is an application layer proto-
col rather than a network layer protocol. Thus, it is far
easier to incorporate DTLS into an application since the
DTLS implementation can simply be delivered with the
application. This ease of deployment is to a great extent
responsible for the wide use of TLS.
Second, DTLS uses the familiar TLS programming
model in which security contexts are application con-
trolled and have a one-to-one relationship with communi-
cation channels. By contrast, there is no standard IPsec
API or programming model and the widely deployed
IPsec implementations are all extremely difficult to pro-
gram to. As previously noted, this is primarily a result of
the fact that the IPsec key management model is extremely
complex compared to that of TLS.
9.2. WTLS
There has been at least one previous attempt to add data-
gram capability to TLS: the Wireless Application Protocol
Forum’s WTLS [11]. However, WTLS made a large num-
ber of other changes, including integrating network trans-
port with the security protocol, thus making it unsuitable
for deployment on the Internet. In addition, WTLS does
not appear to handle small path MTUs. Finally, the WTLS
designers appear to have made a number of optimizations
that lead to security flaws not in TLS [27] and is therefore
not widely used.
9.3. SRTP
The Real Time Protocol (RTP) is widely used to carry
multimedia traffic such as voice and video. RTP has
no support for security. The IETF is currently consid-
ering standardization of the Secure Real Time Protocol
(SRTP) [3] which is an application-specific security pro-
tocol for RTP. SRTP is substantially more limited than
DTLS. First, it cannot be used to protect traffic other than
RTP. Second, it relies on an external signaling protocol
such as SIP to set up the keying material. By contrast,
DTLS can be used to set up its own channel. However, in
extremely bandwidth constrained applications SRTP has
advantages over DTLS because its tight integration with
RTP allows it to have lower network overhead. In situa-
tions where bandwidth is less limited DTLS would be a
potential substitute for SRTP.
10. Future Work
Future work on TLS focuses mostly on integration with
other protocols. Currently, we have an implementation of
DTLS at the early toolkit stage. Our next step is to inte-
grate it with some common datagram-based applications,
which will give us feedback as to the suitability of our de-
sign. Our initial target is SIP. Since SIP already uses TLS
in TCP mode, integrating DTLS in UDP mode is an attrac-
tive design choice and open source SIP implementations
are readily available. Following SIP, we are considering
integrating DTLS with a number of gaming and multime-
dia protocols. Moreover, integrating DTLS with a variety
of other protocols will give us an opportunity to observe
its performance behavior and make changes as appropri-
ate.
We would also like to perform additional performance
tuning on DTLS. Although TLS works well, subsequent
performance analysis has uncovered some unfortunate
interactions with TCP, especially with the Nagle algo-
rithm [24]. As DTLS allows finer control of timers and
record sizes, it is worth doing additional analysis to deter-
mine the optimal values and backoff strategies. Finally,
we intend to do further analysis in an attempt to more
tightly define the security bounds of DTLS.
11. Summary
We have described Datagram Transport Layer Security,
a generic channel security protocol designed for use in
datagram environments. DTLS is based on the well under-
stood TLS protocol and like TLS is designed to provide a
secure channel that mimics the semantics expected by ex-
isting application protocols. Due to simplicity and ease of
deployment, DTLS provides an attractive alternative to IP
security or custom application layer protocols. We have
implemented DTLS as part of the popular OpenSSL cryp-
tographic library and find that it provides acceptable per-
formance and is relatively easy to program to.
12. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dan Boneh, Eu-Jin
Goh, Constantine Sapuntzakis, and Hovav Shacham for
discussions and comments on the design of DTLS. Thanks
to the anonymous reviewers for their comments, which
helped us improve the paper. Also thanks to Steve Kent
for feedback that helped clarify many points. Dan Boneh,
Lisa Dusseault, and Eu-Jin Goh provided comments on
the paper.
The first author is supported by the NSF.
References
[1] F. Andreasen and B. Foster. Media Gateway Control Pro-
tocol (MGCP). RFC 3435, January 2003.
[2] E. B. Ramsdell. S/MIME Version 3 Message Specifica-
tion. RFC 2633, June 1999.
[3] M. Baugher, D. McGrew, D. Oran, R. Blom,
E. Carrara, M. Naslund, and K. Norrman.
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol.
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-08.txt, May 2003.
[4] D. Boneh and D. Brumley. Remote Timing Attacks are
Practical. Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Sym-
posium, August 2003.
[5] B. Canvel, A. Hiltgen, S. Vaudenay, and M. Vuagnoux.
Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel. In Proceed-
ings of the Crypto, August 2003.
[6] M. Crispin. Internet Message Access Protocol - Version
4rev1 (IMAP). RFC 3501, March 2003.
[7] T. Dierks and C. Allen. The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0.
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[8] D. Eastlake. Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC). RFC 2535, March 1999.
[9] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, L. Masinter,
P. Leach, and T. Berners-Lee. Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP). RFC 2616, June 1999.
[10] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, and A. Shamir. Weaknesses in the
Scheduling Algorithm of RC4. In Proceedings of SAC,
August 2001.
[11] W. A. P. Forum. WAP WTLS. WAP Forum protocol stan-
dard, November 1999.
[12] D. Harkins and D. Carrel. The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE). RFC 2409, November 1998.
[13] P. Karn and W. Simpson. Photuris: Session-Key Manage-
ment Protocol. RFC 2522, March 1999.
[14] D. Kegel. The C10K Problem.
http://www.kegel.com/c10k.html.
[15] C. A. Kent and J. C. Mogul. Fragmentation considered
harmful. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, August
1987.
[16] S. Kent and R. Atkinson. IP Authentication Header (AH).
RFC 2402, November 1998.
[17] S. Kent and R. Atkinson. IP Encapsulating Security Pay-
load (ESP). RFC 2406, November 1998.
[18] S. Kent and R. Atkinson. Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol (IPsec). RFC 2401, November 1998.
[19] E. Kohler, M. Handley, S. Floyd, and J. Pad-
hye. Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP).
draft-ietf-dccp-spec-04.txt, June 2003.
[20] C. Metz and B. Phan. PF_KEY Key Management API,
Version 2. RFC 2367, May 1998.
[21] I. Mironov. (Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4. In Pro-
ceedings of Crypto, August 2002.
[22] J. Mogul and S. Deering. Path MTU Discovery. RFC
1191, November 1990.
[23] J. Myers and M. Rose. Post Office Protocol - Version 3
(POP). RFC 1939, May 1996.
[24] J. Nagle. Congestion Control in IP/TCP Internetworks.
RFC 896, January 1984.
[25] E. Rescorla. HTTP Over TLS. RFC 2818, May 2000.
[26] J. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Camarillo, A. Johnston,
J. Peterson, R. Sparks, and M. H. E. Schooler. SIP: Session
Initiation Protocol. RFC 3261, June 2002.
[27] M.-J. O. Saarinen. Attacks against the WAP WTLS proto-
col. CMS 99, 1999.
[28] H. Schulzrinne, S. Casner, R. Frederick, and V. Jacobson.
RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications.
RFC 3550, July 2003.
[29] D. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian. Timing Analysis of
Keystrokes and SSH Timing Attacks. Proceedings of the
10th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2001.
[30] The OpenSSL Project. http://www.openssl.org/.
[31] S. Vaudenay. Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding -
Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS . . . . In Proceedings
of Eurocrypt, April 2002.
Peer-to-Peer Communication Across Network Address Translators
Bryan Ford
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
baford@mit.edu
Pyda Srisuresh
Caymas Systems, Inc.
srisuresh@yahoo.com
Dan Kegel
dank@kegel.com
J’fais des trous, des petits trous. . .
toujours des petits trous
- S. Gainsbourg
Abstract
Network Address Translation (NAT) causes well-known
difficulties for peer-to-peer (P2P) communication, since
the peers involved may not be reachable at any globally
valid IP address. Several NAT traversal techniques are
known, but their documentation is slim, and data about
their robustness or relative merits is slimmer. This paper
documents and analyzes one of the simplest but most ro-
bust and practical NAT traversal techniques, commonly
known as “hole punching.” Hole punching is moderately
well-understood for UDP communication, but we show
how it can be reliably used to set up peer-to-peer TCP
streams as well. After gathering data on the reliability
of this technique on a wide variety of deployed NATs,
we find that about 82% of the NATs tested support hole
punching for UDP, and about 64% support hole punching
for TCP streams. As NAT vendors become increasingly
conscious of the needs of important P2P applications such
as Voice over IP and online gaming protocols, support for
hole punching is likely to increase in the future.
1 Introduction
The combined pressures of tremendous growth and mas-
sive security challenges have forced the Internet to evolve
in ways that make life difficult for many applications.
The Internet’s original uniform address architecture, in
which every node has a globally unique IP address and
can communicate directly with every other node, has been
replaced with a new de facto Internet address architecture,
consisting of a global address realm and many private ad-
dress realms interconnected by Network Address Transla-
tors (NAT). In this new address architecture, illustrated in
Figure 1, only nodes in the “main,” global address realm
Figure 1: Public and private IP address domains
can be easily contacted from anywhere in the network,
because only they have unique, globally routable IP ad-
dresses. Nodes on private networks can connect to other
nodes on the same private network, and they can usually
open TCP or UDP connections to “well-known” nodes
in the global address realm. NATs on the path allocate
temporary public endpoints for outgoing connections, and
translate the addresses and port numbers in packets com-
prising those sessions, while generally blocking all in-
coming traffic unless otherwise specifically configured.
The Internet’s new de facto address architecture is suit-
able for client/server communication in the typical case
when the client is on a private network and the server is in
the global address realm. The architecture makes it diffi-
cult for two nodes on different private networks to contact
each other directly, however, which is often important to
the “peer-to-peer” communication protocols used in ap-
plications such as teleconferencing and online gaming.
We clearly need a way to make such protocols function
smoothly in the presence of NAT.
One of the most effective methods of establishing peer-
to-peer communication between hosts on different private
networks is known as “hole punching.” This technique
is widely used already in UDP-based applications, but es-
sentially the same technique also works for TCP. Contrary
to what its name may suggest, hole punching does not
compromise the security of a private network. Instead,
hole punching enables applications to function within the
the default security policy of most NATs, effectively sig-
naling to NATs on the path that peer-to-peer communica-
tion sessions are “solicited” and thus should be accepted.
This paper documents hole punching for both UDP and
TCP, and details the crucial aspects of both application
and NAT behavior that make hole punching work.
Unfortunately, no traversal technique works with all ex-
isting NATs, because NAT behavior is not standardized.
This paper presents some experimental results evaluating
hole punching support in current NATs. Our data is de-
rived from results submitted by users throughout the In-
ternet by running our “NAT Check” tool over a wide va-
riety of NATs by different vendors. While the data points
were gathered from a “self-selecting” user community and
may not be representative of the true distribution of NAT
implementations deployed on the Internet, the results are
nevertheless generally encouraging.
While evaluating basic hole punching, we also point out
variations that can make hole punching work on a wider
variety of existing NATs at the cost of greater complexity.
Our primary focus, however, is on developing the simplest
hole punching technique that works cleanly and robustly
in the presence of “well-behaved” NATs in any reason-
able network topology. We deliberately avoid excessively
clever tricks that may increase compatibility with some
existing “broken” NATs in the short term, but which only
work some of the time and may cause additional unpre-
dictability and network brittleness in the long term.
Although the larger address space of IPv6 [3] may
eventually reduce the need for NAT, in the short term
IPv6 is increasing the demand for NAT, because NAT it-
self provides the easiest way to achieve interoperability
between IPv4 and IPv6 address domains [24]. Further,
the anonymity and inaccessibility of hosts on private net-
works has widely perceived security and privacy benefits.
Firewalls are unlikely to go away even when there are
enough IP addresses: IPv6 firewalls will still commonly
block unsolicited incoming traffic by default, making hole
punching useful even to IPv6 applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces basic terminology and NAT traversal concepts.
Section 3 details hole punching for UDP, and Section 4
introduces hole punching for TCP. Section 5 summarizes
important properties a NAT must have in order to enable
hole punching. Section 6 presents our experimental re-
sults on hole punching support in popular NATs, Section 7
discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes.
2 General Concepts
This section introduces basic NAT terminology used
throughout the paper, and then outlines general NAT
traversal techniques that apply equally to TCP and UDP.
2.1 NAT Terminology
This paper adopts the NAT terminology and taxonomy de-
fined in RFC 2663 [21], as well as additional terms de-
fined more recently in RFC 3489 [19].
Of particular importance is the notion of session. A
session endpoint for TCP or UDP is an (IP address, port
number) pair, and a particular session is uniquely identi-
fied by its two session endpoints. From the perspective of
one of the hosts involved, a session is effectively identi-
fied by the 4-tuple (local IP, local port, remote IP, remote
port). The direction of a session is normally the flow di-
rection of the packet that initiates the session: the initial
SYN packet for TCP, or the first user datagram for UDP.
Of the various flavors of NAT, the most common type
is traditional or outbound NAT, which provides an asym-
metric bridge between a private network and a public
network. Outbound NAT by default allows only out-
bound sessions to traverse the NAT: incoming packets are
dropped unless the NAT identifies them as being part of an
existing session initiated from within the private network.
Outbound NAT conflicts with peer-to-peer protocols be-
cause when both peers desiring to communicate are “be-
hind” (on the private network side of) two different NATs,
whichever peer tries to initiate a session, the other peer’s
NAT rejects it. NAT traversal entails making P2P sessions
look like “outbound” sessions to both NATs.
Outbound NAT has two sub-varieties: Basic NAT,
which only translates IP addresses, and Network Ad-
dress/Port Translation (NAPT), which translates entire
session endpoints. NAPT, the more general variety, has
also become the most common because it enables the
hosts on a private network to share the use of a single pub-
lic IP address. Throughout this paper we assume NAPT,
though the principles and techniques we discuss apply
equally well (if sometimes trivially) to Basic NAT.
Figure 2: NAT Traversal by Relaying
2.2 Relaying
The most reliable—but least efficient—method of P2P
communication across NAT is simply to make the com-
munication look to the network like standard client/server
communication, through relaying. Suppose two client
hosts A and B have each initiated TCP or UDP connec-
tions to a well-known server S, at S’s global IP address
18.181.0.31 and port number 1234. As shown in Figure 2,
the clients reside on separate private networks, and their
respective NATs prevent either client from directly initiat-
ing a connection to the other. Instead of attempting a di-
rect connection, the two clients can simply use the server
S to relay messages between them. For example, to send
a message to client B, client A simply sends the message
to server S along its already-established client/server con-
nection, and server S forwards the message on to client B
using its existing client/server connection with B.
Relaying always works as long as both clients can con-
nect to the server. Its disadvantages are that it consumes
the server’s processing power and network bandwidth,
and communication latency between the peering clients is
likely increased even if the server is well-connected. Nev-
ertheless, since there is no more efficient technique that
works reliably on all existing NATs, relaying is a useful
fall-back strategy if maximum robustness is desired. The
TURN protocol [18] defines a method of implementing
relaying in a relatively secure fashion.
2.3 Connection Reversal
Some P2P applications use a straightforward but limited
technique, known as connection reversal, to enable com-
munication when both hosts have connections to a well-
Figure 3: NAT Traversal by Connection Reversal
known rendezvous server S and only one of the peers is
behind a NAT, as shown in Figure 3. If A wants to ini-
tiate a connection to B, then a direct connection attempt
works automatically, because B is not behind a NAT and
A’s NAT interprets the connection as an outgoing session.
If B wants to initiate a connection to A, however, any
direct connection attempt to A is blocked by A’s NAT.
B can instead relay a connection request to A through
a well-known server S, asking A to attempt a “reverse”
connection back to B. Despite the obvious limitations of
this technique, the central idea of using a well-known ren-
dezvous server as an intermediary to help set up direct
peer-to-peer connections is fundamental to the more gen-
eral hole punching techniques described next.
3 UDP Hole Punching
UDP hole punching enables two clients to set up a direct
peer-to-peer UDP session with the help of a well-known
rendezvous server, even if the clients are both behind
NATs. This technique was mentioned in section 5.1 of
RFC 3027 [10], documented more thoroughly elsewhere
on the Web [13], and used in recent experimental Internet
protocols [17, 11]. Various proprietary protocols, such as
those for on-line gaming, also use UDP hole punching.
3.1 The Rendezvous Server
Hole punching assumes that the two clients, A and B, al-
ready have active UDP sessions with a rendezvous server
S. When a client registers with S, the server records two
endpoints for that client: the (IP address, UDP port) pair
that the client believes itself to be using to talk with S,
and the (IP address, UDP port) pair that the server ob-
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serves the client to be using to talk with it. We refer to the
first pair as the client’s private endpoint and the second
as the client’s public endpoint. The server might obtain
the client’s private endpoint from the client itself in a field
in the body of the client’s registration message, and obtain
the client’s public endpoint from the source IP address and
source UDP port fields in the IP and UDP headers of that
registration message. If the client is not behind a NAT,
then its private and public endpoints should be identical.
A few poorly behaved NATs are known to scan the
body of UDP datagrams for 4-byte fields that look like IP
addresses, and translate them as they would the IP address
fields in the IP header. To be robust against such behav-
ior, applications may wish to obfuscate IP addresses in
messages bodies slightly, for example by transmitting the
one’s complement of the IP address instead of the IP ad-
dress itself. Of course, if the application is encrypting its
messages, then this behavior is not likely to be a problem.
3.2 Establishing Peer-to-Peer Sessions
Suppose client A wants to establish a UDP session di-
rectly with client B. Hole punching proceeds as follows:
1. A initially does not know how to reach B, so A asks
S for help establishing a UDP session with B.
2. S replies to A with a message containing B’s public
and private endpoints. At the same time, S uses its
UDP session with B to send B a connection request
message containing A’s public and private endpoints.
Once these messages are received, A and B know
each other’s public and private endpoints.
3. When A receives B’s public and private endpoints
from S, A starts sending UDP packets to both
of these endpoints, and subsequently “locks in”
whichever endpoint first elicits a valid response from
B. Similarly, when B receives A’s public and pri-
vate endpoints in the forwarded connection request,
B starts sending UDP packets to A at each of A’s
known endpoints, locking in the first endpoint that
works. The order and timing of these messages are
not critical as long as they are asynchronous.
We now consider how UDP hole punching handles each
of three specific network scenarios. In the first situation,
representing the “easy” case, the two clients actually re-
side behind the same NAT, on one private network. In the
second, most common case, the clients reside behind dif-
ferent NATs. In the third scenario, the clients each reside
behind two levels of NAT: a common “first-level” NAT de-
ployed by an ISP for example, and distinct “second-level”
NATs such as consumer NAT routers for home networks.
It is in general difficult or impossible for the applica-
tion itself to determine the exact physical layout of the
network, and thus which of these scenarios (or the many
other possible ones) actually applies at a given time. Pro-
tocols such as STUN [19] can provide some information
about the NATs present on a communication path, but this
information may not always be complete or reliable, espe-
cially when multiple levels of NAT are involved. Never-
theless, hole punching works automatically in all of these
scenarios without the application having to know the spe-
cific network organization, as long as the NATs involved
behave in a reasonable fashion. (“Reasonable” behavior
for NATs will be described later in Section 5.)
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3.3 Peers Behind a Common NAT
First consider the simple scenario in which the two clients
(probably unknowingly) happen to reside behind the same
NAT, and are therefore located in the same private IP ad-
dress realm, as shown in Figure 4. Client A has estab-
lished a UDP session with server S, to which the com-
mon NAT has assigned its own public port number 62000.
Client B has similarly established a session with S, to
which the NAT has assigned public port number 62005.
Suppose that client A uses the hole punching technique
outlined above to establish a UDP session with B, using
server S as an introducer. Client A sends S a message
requesting a connection to B. S responds to A with B’s
public and private endpoints, and also forwards A’s pub-
lic and private endpoints to B. Both clients then attempt
to send UDP datagrams to each other directly at each of
these endpoints. The messages directed to the public end-
points may or may not reach their destination, depending
on whether or not the NAT supports hairpin translation as
described below in Section 3.5. The messages directed at
the private endpoints do reach their destinations, however,
and since this direct route through the private network is
likely to be faster than an indirect route through the NAT
anyway, the clients are most likely to select the private
endpoints for subsequent regular communication.
By assuming that NATs support hairpin translation, the
application might dispense with the complexity of trying
private as well as public endpoints, at the cost of making
local communication behind a common NAT unnecessar-
ily pass through the NAT. As our results in Section 6 show,
however, hairpin translation is still much less common
among existing NATs than are other “P2P-friendly” NAT
behaviors. For now, therefore, applications may benefit
substantially by using both public and private endpoints.
3.4 Peers Behind Different NATs
Suppose clients A and B have private IP addresses be-
hind different NATs, as shown in Figure 5. A and B have
each initiated UDP communication sessions from their lo-
cal port 4321 to port 1234 on server S. In handling these
outbound sessions, NAT A has assigned port 62000 at its
own public IP address, 155.99.25.11, for the use of A’s
session with S, and NAT B has assigned port 31000 at its
IP address, 138.76.29.7, to B’s session with S.
In A’s registration message to S, A reports its private
endpoint to S as 10.0.0.1:4321, where 10.0.0.1 is A’s IP
address on its own private network. S records A’s re-
ported private endpoint, along with A’s public endpoint
as observed by S itself. A’s public endpoint in this case
is 155.99.25.11:62000, the temporary endpoint assigned
to the session by the NAT. Similarly, when client B regis-
ters, S records B’s private endpoint as 10.1.1.3:4321 and
B’s public endpoint as 138.76.29.7:31000.
Now client A follows the hole punching procedure de-
scribed above to establish a UDP communication session
directly with B. First, A sends a request message to S ask-
ing for help connecting with B. In response, S sends B’s
public and private endpoints to A, and sends A’s public
and private endpoints to B. A and B each start trying to
send UDP datagrams directly to each of these endpoints.
Since A and B are on different private networks and
their respective private IP addresses are not globally
routable, the messages sent to these endpoints will reach
either the wrong host or no host at all. Because many
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NATs also act as DHCP servers, handing out IP addresses
in a fairly deterministic way from a private address pool
usually determined by the NAT vendor by default, it is
quite likely in practice that A’s messages directed at B’s
private endpoint will reach some (incorrect) host on A’s
private network that happens to have the same private IP
address as B does. Applications must therefore authen-
ticate all messages in some way to filter out such stray
traffic robustly. The messages might include application-
specific names or cryptographic tokens, for example, or at
least a random nonce pre-arranged through S.
Now consider A’s first message sent to B’s public end-
point, as shown in Figure 5. As this outbound message
passes through A’s NAT, this NAT notices that this is the
first UDP packet in a new outgoing session. The new ses-
sion’s source endpoint (10.0.0.1:4321) is the same as that
of the existing session between A and S, but its desti-
nation endpoint is different. If NAT A is well-behaved, it
preserves the identity of A’s private endpoint, consistently
translating all outbound sessions from private source end-
point 10.0.0.1:4321 to the corresponding public source
endpoint 155.99.25.11:62000. A’s first outgoing mes-
sage to B’s public endpoint thus, in effect, “punches a
hole” in A’s NAT for a new UDP session identified by the
endpoints (10.0.0.1:4321, 138.76.29.7:31000) on A’s pri-
vate network, and by the endpoints (155.99.25.11:62000,
138.76.29.7:31000) on the main Internet.
If A’s message to B’s public endpoint reaches B’s NAT
before B’s first message to A has crossed B’s own NAT,
then B’s NAT may interpret A’s inbound message as un-
solicited incoming traffic and drop it. B’s first message
to A’s public address, however, similarly opens a hole in
B’s NAT, for a new UDP session identified by the end-
points (10.1.1.3:4321, 155.99.25.11:62000) on B’s pri-
vate network, and by the endpoints (138.76.29.7:31000,
155.99.25.11:62000) on the Internet. Once the first mes-
sages from A and B have crossed their respective NATs,
holes are open in each direction and UDP communica-
tion can proceed normally. Once the clients have verified
that the public endpoints work, they can stop sending mes-
sages to the alternative private endpoints.
3.5 Peers Behind Multiple Levels of NAT
In some topologies involving multiple NAT devices, two
clients cannot establish an “optimal” P2P route between
them without specific knowledge of the topology. Con-
sider a final scenario, depicted in Figure 6. Suppose NAT
C is a large industrial NAT deployed by an internet ser-
vice provider (ISP) to multiplex many customers onto a
few public IP addresses, and NATs A and B are small
consumer NAT routers deployed independently by two of
the ISP’s customers to multiplex their private home net-
works onto their respective ISP-provided IP addresses.
Only server S and NAT C have globally routable IP ad-
dresses; the “public” IP addresses used by NAT A and
NAT B are actually private to the ISP’s address realm,
while client A’s and B’s addresses in turn are private to
the addressing realms of NAT A and NAT B, respectively.
Each client initiates an outgoing connection to server S as
before, causing NATs A and B each to create a single pub-
lic/private translation, and causing NAT C to establish a
public/private translation for each session.
Now suppose A and B attempt to establish a direct
peer-to-peer UDP connection via hole punching. The
optimal routing strategy would be for client A to send
messages to client B’s “semi-public” endpoint at NAT
B, 10.0.1.2:55000 in the ISP’s addressing realm, and
for client B to send messages to A’s “semi-public” end-
point at NAT B, namely 10.0.1.1:45000. Unfortunately,
A and B have no way to learn these addresses, because
server S only sees the truly global public endpoints of the
clients, 155.99.25.11:62000 and 155.99.25.11:62005 re-
spectively. Even if A and B had some way to learn these
addresses, there is still no guarantee that they would be
usable, because the address assignments in the ISP’s pri-
vate address realm might conflict with unrelated address
assignments in the clients’ private realms. (NAT A’s IP
address in NAT C’s realm might just as easily have been
10.1.1.3, for example, the same as client B’s private ad-
dress in NAT B’s realm.)
The clients therefore have no choice but to use their
global public addresses as seen by S for their P2P com-
munication, and rely on NAT C providing hairpin or loop-
back translation. When A sends a UDP datagram to B’s
global endpoint, 155.99.25.11:62005, NAT A first trans-
lates the datagram’s source endpoint from 10.0.0.1:4321
to 10.0.1.1:45000. The datagram now reaches NAT C,
which recognizes that the datagram’s destination address
is one of NAT C’s own translated public endpoints. If
NAT C is well-behaved, it then translates both the source
and destination addresses in the datagram and “loops”
the datagram back onto the private network, now with a
source endpoint of 155.99.25.11:62000 and a destination
endpoint of 10.0.1.2:55000. NAT B finally translates the
datagram’s destination address as the datagram enters B’s
private network, and the datagram reaches B. The path
back to A works similarly. Many NATs do not yet support
hairpin translation, but it is becoming more common as
NAT vendors become aware of this issue.
3.6 UDP Idle Timeouts
Since the UDP transport protocol provides NATs with
no reliable, application-independent way to determine the
lifetime of a session crossing the NAT, most NATs simply
associate an idle timer with UDP translations, closing the
hole if no traffic has used it for some time period. There
is unfortunately no standard value for this timer: some
NATs have timeouts as short as 20 seconds. If the appli-
cation needs to keep an idle UDP session active after es-
tablishing the session via hole punching, the application
must send periodic keep-alive packets to ensure that the
relevant translation state in the NATs does not disappear.
Unfortunately, many NATs associate UDP idle timers
with individual UDP sessions defined by a particular pair
of endpoints, so sending keep-alives on one session will
not keep other sessions active even if all the sessions orig-
inate from the same private endpoint. Instead of sending
keep-alives on many different P2P sessions, applications
can avoid excessive keep-alive traffic by detecting when a
UDP session no longer works, and re-running the original
hole punching procedure again “on demand.”
4 TCP Hole Punching
Establishing peer-to-peer TCP connections between hosts
behind NATs is slightly more complex than for UDP, but
TCP hole punching is remarkably similar at the protocol
level. Since it is not as well-understood, it is currently
supported by fewer existing NATs. When the NATs in-
volved do support it, however, TCP hole punching is just
as fast and reliable as UDP hole punching. Peer-to-peer
TCP communication across well-behaved NATs may in
fact be more robust than UDP communication, because
unlike UDP, the TCP protocol’s state machine gives NATs
on the path a standard way to determine the precise life-
time of a particular TCP session.
4.1 Sockets and TCP Port Reuse
The main practical challenge to applications wishing to
implement TCP hole punching is not a protocol issue but
an application programming interface (API) issue. Be-
cause the standard Berkeley sockets API was designed
around the client/server paradigm, the API allows a TCP
stream socket to be used to initiate an outgoing connection
via connect(), or to listen for incoming connections
via listen() and accept(), but not both. Further,
TCP sockets usually have a one-to-one correspondence to
TCP port numbers on the local host: after the application
binds one socket to a particular local TCP port, attempts
to bind a second socket to the same TCP port fail.
For TCP hole punching to work, however, we need to
use a single local TCP port to listen for incoming TCP
connections and to initiate multiple outgoing TCP con-
nections concurrently. Fortunately, all major operating
systems support a special TCP socket option, commonly
named SO_REUSEADDR, which allows the application to
bind multiple sockets to the same local endpoint as long
as this option is set on all of the sockets involved. BSD
systems have introduced a SO_REUSEPORT option that
controls port reuse separately from address reuse; on such
systems both of these options must be set.
4.2 Opening Peer-to-Peer TCP Streams
Suppose that client A wishes to set up a TCP connection
with client B. We assume as usual that both A and B
already have active TCP connections with a well-known
rendezvous server S. The server records each registered
client’s public and private endpoints, just as for UDP. At
the protocol level, TCP hole punching works almost ex-
actly as for UDP:
1. Client A uses its active TCP session with S to ask S
for help connecting to B.
2. S replies to A with B’s public and private TCP end-
points, and at the same time sends A’s public and
private endpoints to B.
3. From the same local TCP ports that A and B used to
register with S, A and B each asynchronously make
outgoing connection attempts to the other’s public
and private endpoints as reported by S, while simul-
taneously listening for incoming connections on their
respective local TCP ports.
4. A and B wait for outgoing connection attempts to
succeed, and/or for incoming connections to appear.
If one of the outgoing connection attempts fails due
to a network error such as “connection reset” or “host
unreachable,” the host simply re-tries that connection
attempt after a short delay (e.g., one second), up to
an application-defind maximum timeout period.
5. When a TCP connection is made, the hosts authen-
ticate each other to verify that they connected to the
intended host. If authentication fails, the clients close
that connection and continue waiting for others to
succeed. The clients use the first successfully au-
thenticated TCP stream resulting from this process.
Unlike with UDP, where each client only needs one
socket to communicate with both S and any number of
peers simultaneously, with TCP each client application
must manage several sockets bound to a single local TCP
port on that client node, as shown in Figure 7. Each client
needs a stream socket representing its connection to S,
a listen socket on which to accept incoming connections
from peers, and at least two additional stream sockets with
which to initiate outgoing connections to the other peer’s
public and private TCP endpoints.
Consider the common-case scenario in which the
clients A and B are behind different NATs, as shown in
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Figure 5, and assume that the port numbers shown in the
figure are now for TCP rather than UDP ports. The outgo-
ing connection attempts A and B make to each other’s pri-
vate endpoints either fail or connect to the wrong host. As
with UDP, it is important that TCP applications authenti-
cate their peer-to-peer sessions, due of the likelihood of
mistakenly connecting to a random host on the local net-
work that happens to have the same private IP address as
the desired host on a remote private network.
The clients’ outgoing connection attempts to each
other’s public endpoints, however, cause the respective
NATs to open up new “holes” enabling direct TCP com-
munication between A and B. If the NATs are well-
behaved, then a new peer-to-peer TCP stream automat-
ically forms between them. If A’s first SYN packet to
B reaches B’s NAT before B’s first SYN packet to A
reaches B’s NAT, for example, then B’s NAT may in-
terpret A’s SYN as an unsolicited incoming connection
attempt and drop it. B’s first SYN packet to A should
subsequently get through, however, because A’s NAT sees
this SYN as being part of the outbound session to B that
A’s first SYN had already initiated.
4.3 Behavior Observed by the Application
What the client applications observe to happen with their
sockets during TCP hole punching depends on the tim-
ing and the TCP implementations involved. Suppose that
A’s first outbound SYN packet to B’s public endpoint is
dropped by NAT B, but B’s first subsequent SYN packet
to A’s public endpoint gets through to A before A’s TCP
retransmits its SYN. Depending on the operating system
involved, one of two things may happen:
• A’s TCP implementation notices that the session
endpoints for the incoming SYN match those of an
outbound session A was attempting to initiate. A’s
TCP stack therefore associates this new session with
the socket that the local application on A was using
to connect() to B’s public endpoint. The applica-
tion’s asynchronous connect() call succeeds, and
nothing happens with the application’s listen socket.
Since the received SYN packet did not include an
ACK for A’s previous outbound SYN, A’s TCP
replies to B’s public endpoint with a SYN-ACK
packet, the SYN part being merely a replay of A’s
original outbound SYN, using the same sequence
number. Once B’s TCP receives A’s SYN-ACK, it
responds with its own ACK for A’s SYN, and the
TCP session enters the connected state on both ends.
• Alternatively, A’s TCP implementation might in-
stead notice that A has an active listen socket on
that port waiting for incoming connection attempts.
Since B’s SYN looks like an incoming connection
attempt, A’s TCP creates a new stream socket with
which to associate the new TCP session, and hands
this new socket to the application via the applica-
tion’s next accept() call on its listen socket. A’s
TCP then responds to B with a SYN-ACK as above,
and TCP connection setup proceeds as usual for
client/server-style connections.
Since A’s prior outbound connect() attempt to
B used a combination of source and destination
endpoints that is now in use by another socket,
namely the one just returned to the application
via accept(), A’s asynchronous connect() at-
tempt must fail at some point, typically with an “ad-
dress in use” error. The application nevertheless has
the working peer-to-peer stream socket it needs to
communicate with B, so it ignores this failure.
The first behavior above appears to be usual for BSD-
based operating systems, whereas the second behavior ap-
pears more common under Linux and Windows.
4.4 Simultaneous TCP Open
Suppose that the timing of the various connection at-
tempts during the hole punching process works out so that
the initial outgoing SYN packets from both clients tra-
verse their respective local NATs, opening new outbound
TCP sessions in each NAT, before reaching the remote
NAT. In this “lucky” case, the NATs do not reject either
of the initial SYN packets, and the SYNs cross on the
wire between the two NATs. In this case, the clients ob-
serve an event known as a simultaneous TCP open: each
peer’s TCP receives a “raw” SYN while waiting for a
SYN-ACK. Each peer’s TCP responds with a SYN-ACK,
whose SYN part essentially “replays” the peer’s previous
outgoing SYN, and whose ACK part acknowledges the
SYN received from the other peer.
What the respective applications observe in this case
again depends on the behavior of the TCP implementa-
tions involved, as described in the previous section. If
both clients implement the second behavior above, it may
be that all of the asynchronous connect() calls made
by the application ultimately fail, but the application run-
ning on each client nevertheless receives a new, working
peer-to-peer TCP stream socket via accept()—as if
this TCP stream had magically “created itself” on the wire
and was merely passively accepted at the endpoints! As
long as the application does not care whether it ultimately
receives its peer-to-peer TCP sockets via connect()
or accept(), the process results in a working stream
on any TCP implementation that properly implements the
standard TCP state machine specified in RFC 793 [23].
Each of the alternative network organization scenarios
discussed in Section 3 for UDP works in exactly the same
way for TCP. For example, TCP hole punching works in
multi-level NAT scenarios such as the one in Figure 6 as
long as the NATs involved are well-behaved.
4.5 Sequential Hole Punching
In a variant of the above TCP hole punching procedure
implemented by the NatTrav library [4], the clients at-
tempt connections to each other sequentially rather than
in parallel. For example: (1) A informs B via S of its
desire to communicate, without simultaneously listening
on its local port; (2) B makes a connect() attempt to
A, which opens a hole in B’s NAT but then fails due to
a timeout or RST from A’s NAT or a RST from A itself;
(3) B closes its connection to S and does a listen()
on its local port; (4) S in turn closes its connection with
A, signaling A to attempt a connect() directly to B.
This sequential procedure may be particularly useful on
Windows hosts prior to XP Service Pack 2, which did
not correctly implement simultaneous TCP open, or on
sockets APIs that do not support the SO_REUSEADDR
functionality. The sequential procedure is more timing-
dependent, however, and may be slower in the common
case and less robust in unusual situations. In step (2), for
example, B must allow its “doomed-to-fail”connect()
attempt enough time to ensure that at least one SYN
packet traverses all NATs on its side of the network. Too
little delay risks a lost SYN derailing the process, whereas
too much delay increases the total time required for hole
punching. The sequential hole punching procedure also
effectively “consumes” both clients’ connections to the
server S, requiring the clients to open fresh connections to
S for each new P2P connection to be forged. The parallel
hole punching procedure, in contrast, typically completes
as soon as both clients make their outgoing connect()
attempts, and allows each client to retain and re-use a sin-
gle connection to S indefinitely.
5 Properties of P2P-Friendly NATs
This section describes the key behavioral properties NATs
must have in order for the hole punching techniques de-
scribed above to work properly. Not all current NAT
implementations satisfy these properties, but many do,
and NATs are gradually becoming more “P2P-friendly”
as NAT vendors recognize the demand for peer-to-peer
protocols such as voice over IP and on-line gaming.
This section is not meant to be a complete or definitive
specification for how NATs “should” behave; we provide
it merely for information about the most commonly ob-
served behaviors that enable or break P2P hole punching.
The IETF has started a new working group, BEHAVE, to
define official “best current practices” for NAT behavior.
The BEHAVE group’s initial drafts include the consider-
ations outlined in this section and others; NAT vendors
should of course follow the IETF working group directly
as official behavioral standards are formulated.
5.1 Consistent Endpoint Translation
The hole punching techniques described here only work
automatically if the NAT consistently maps a given TCP
or UDP source endpoint on the private network to a single
corresponding public endpoint controlled by the NAT. A
NAT that behaves in this way is referred to as a cone NAT
in RFC 3489 [19] and elsewhere, because the NAT “fo-
cuses” all sessions originating from a single private end-
point through the same public endpoint on the NAT.
Consider again the scenario in Figure 5, for example.
When client A initially contacted the well-known server
S, NAT A chose to use port 62000 at its own public IP
address, 155.99.25.11, as a temporary public endpoint to
representing A’s private endpoint 10.0.0.1:4321. When A
later attempts to establish a peer-to-peer session with B by
sending a message from the same local private endpoint to
B’s public endpoint, A depends on NAT A preserving the
identity of this private endpoint, and re-using the exist-
ing public endpoint of 155.99.25.11:62000, because that
is the public endpoint for A to which B will be sending
its corresponding messages.
A NAT that is only designed to support client/server
protocols will not necessarily preserve the identities of
private endpoints in this way. Such a NAT is a symmet-
ric NAT in RFC 3489 terminology. For example, after the
NAT assigns the public endpoint 155.99.25.11:62000 to
client A’s session with server S, the NAT might assign
a different public endpoint, such as 155.99.25.11:62001,
to the P2P session that A tries to initiate with B. In this
case, the hole punching process fails to provide connec-
tivity, because the subsequent incoming messages from B
reach NAT A at the wrong port number.
Many symmetric NATs allocate port numbers for suc-
cessive sessions in a fairly predictable way. Exploiting
this fact, variants of hole punching algorithms [9, 1] can
be made to work “much of the time” even over symmetric
NATs by first probing the NAT’s behavior using a protocol
such as STUN [19], and using the resulting information to
“predict” the public port number the NAT will assign to a
new session. Such prediction techniques amount to chas-
ing a moving target, however, and many things can go
wrong along the way. The predicted port number might
already be in use causing the NAT to jump to another port
number, for example, or another client behind the same
NAT might initiate an unrelated session at the wrong time
so as to allocate the predicted port number. While port
number prediction can be a useful trick for achieving max-
imum compatibility with badly-behaved existing NATs,
it does not represent a robust long-term solution. Since
symmetric NAT provides no greater security than a cone
NAT with per-session traffic filtering, symmetric NAT is
becoming less common as NAT vendors adapt their algo-
rithms to support P2P protocols.
5.2 Handling Unsolicited TCP Connections
When a NAT receives a SYN packet on its public side for
what appears to be an unsolicited incoming connection
attempt, it is important that the NAT just silently drop the
SYN packet. Some NATs instead actively reject such in-
coming connections by sending back a TCP RST packet
or even an ICMP error report, which interferes with the
TCP hole punching process. Such behavior is not nec-
essarily fatal, as long as the applications re-try outgoing
connection attempts as specified in step 4 of the process
described in Section 4.2, but the resulting transient errors
can make hole punching take longer.
5.3 Leaving Payloads Alone
A few existing NATs are known to scan “blindly” through
packet payloads for 4-byte values that look like IP ad-
dresses, and translate them as they would the IP address
in the packet header, without knowing anything about the
application protocol in use. This bad behavior fortunately
appears to be uncommon, and applications can easily pro-
tect themselves against it by obfuscating IP addresses they
send in messages, for example by sending the bitwise
complement of the desired IP address.
5.4 Hairpin Translation
Some multi-level NAT situations require hairpin transla-
tion support in order for either TCP or UDP hole punch-
ing to work, as described in Section 3.5. The scenario
shown in Figure 6, for example, depends on NAT C pro-
viding hairpin translation. Support for hairpin translation
is unfortunately rare in current NATs, but fortunately so
are the network scenarios that require it. Multi-level NAT
is becoming more common as IPv4 address space deple-
tion continues, however, so support for hairpin translation
is important in future NAT implementations.
6 Evaluation of Existing NATs
To evaluate the robustness of the TCP and UDP hole
punching techniques described in this paper on a variety
of existing NATs, we implemented and distributed a test
program called NAT Check [16], and solicited data from
Internet users about their NATs.
NAT Check’s primary purpose is to test NATs for the
two behavioral properties most crucial to reliable UDP
and TCP hole punching: namely, consistent identity-
preserving endpoint translation (Section 5.1), and silently
dropping unsolicited incoming TCP SYNs instead of re-
jecting them with RSTs or ICMP errors (Section 5.2). In
addition, NAT Check separately tests whether the NAT
supports hairpin translation (Section 5.4), and whether the
NAT filters unsolicited incoming traffic at all. This last
property does not affect hole punching, but provides a use-
ful indication the NAT’s firewall policy.
NAT Check makes no attempt to test every relevant
facet of NAT behavior individually: a wide variety of sub-
tle behavioral differences are known, some of which are
difficult to test reliably [12]. Instead, NAT Check merely
attempts to answer the question, “how commonly can the
proposed hole punching techniques be expected to work
on deployed NATs, under typical network conditions?”
6.1 Test Method
NAT Check consists of a client program to be run on a ma-
chine behind the NAT to be tested, and three well-known
servers at different global IP addresses. The client coop-
erates with the three servers to check the NAT behavior
relevant to both TCP and UDP hole punching. The client
Figure 8: NAT Check Test Method for UDP
program is small and relatively portable, currently run-
ning on Windows, Linux, BSD, and Mac OS X. The ma-
chines hosting the well-known servers all run FreeBSD.
6.1.1 UDP Test
To test the NAT’s behavior for UDP, the client opens a
socket and binds it to a local UDP port, then successively
sends “ping”-like requests to servers 1 and 2, as shown
in Figure 8. These servers each respond to the client’s
pings with a reply that includes the client’s public UDP
endpoint: the client’s own IP address and UDP port num-
ber as observed by the server. If the two servers report the
same public endpoint for the client, NAT Check assumes
that the NAT properly preserves the identity of the client’s
private endpoint, satisfying the primary precondition for
reliable UDP hole punching.
When server 2 receives a UDP request from the client,
besides replying directly to the client it also forwards the
request to server 3, which in turn replies to the client from
its own IP address. If the NAT’s firewall properly fil-
ters “unsolicited” incoming traffic on a per-session basis,
then the client never sees these replies from server 3, even
though they are directed at the same public port as the
replies from servers 1 and 2.
To test the NAT for hairpin translation support, the
client simply opens a second UDP socket at a different lo-
cal port and uses it to send messages to the public endpoint
representing the client’s first UDP socket, as reported by
server 2. If these messages reach the client’s first private
endpoint, then the NAT supports hairpin translation.
6.1.2 TCP Test
The TCP test follows a similar pattern as for UDP. The
client uses a single local TCP port to initiate outbound
sessions to servers 1 and 2, and checks whether the public
endpoints reported by servers 1 and 2 are the same, the
first precondition for reliable TCP hole punching.
The NAT’s response to unsolicited incoming connec-
tion attempts also impacts the speed and reliability of TCP
hole punching, however, so NAT Check also tests this be-
havior. When server 2 receives the client’s request, in-
stead of immediately replying to the client, it forwards a
request to server 3 and waits for server 3 to respond with a
“go-ahead” signal. When server 3 receives this forwarded
request, it attempts to initiate an inbound connection to
the client’s public TCP endpoint. Server 3 waits up to
five seconds for this connection to succeed or fail, and if
the connection attempt is still “in progress” after five sec-
onds, server 3 responds to server 2 with the “go-ahead”
signal and continues waiting for up to 20 seconds. Once
the client finally receives server 2’s reply (which server
2 delayed waiting for server 3’s “go-ahead” signal), the
client attempts an outbound connection to server 3, effec-
tively causing a simultaneous TCP open with server 3.
What happens during this test depends on the NAT’s
behavior as follows. If the NAT properly just drops server
3’s “unsolicited” incoming SYN packets, then nothing
happens on the client’s listen socket during the five sec-
ond period before server 2 replies to the client. When the
client finally initiates its own connection to server 3, open-
ing a hole through the NAT, the attempt succeeds imme-
diately. If on the other hand the NAT does not drop server
3’s unsolicited incoming SYNs but allows them through
(which is fine for hole punching but not ideal for secu-
rity), then the client receives an incoming TCP connec-
tion on its listen socket before receiving server 2’s reply.
Finally, if the NAT actively rejects server 3’s unsolicited
incoming SYNs by sending back TCP RST packets, then
server 3 gives up and the client’s subsequent attempt to
connect to server 3 fails.
To test hairpin translation for TCP, the client simply
uses a secondary local TCP port to attempt a connection
to the public endpoint corresponding to its primary TCP
port, in the same way as for UDP.
6.2 Test Results
The NAT Check data we gathered consists of 380 reported
data points covering a variety of NAT router hardware
from 68 vendors, as well as the NAT functionality built
into different versions of eight popular operating systems.
Only 335 of the total data points include results for UDP
hairpin translation, and only 286 data points include re-
sults for TCP, because we implemented these features in
later versions of NAT Check after we had already started
gathering results. The data is summarized by NAT ven-
dor in Table 1; the table only individually lists vendors for
which at least five data points were available. The varia-
tions in the test results for a given vendor can be accounted
for by a variety of factors, such as different NAT devices
or product lines sold by the same vendor, different soft-
ware or firmware versions of the same NAT implemen-
tation, different configurations, and probably occasional
NAT Check testing or reporting errors.
Out of the 380 reported data points for UDP, in 310
cases (82%) the NAT consistently translated the client’s
private endpoint, indicating basic compatibility with UDP
hole punching. Support for hairpin translation is much
less common, however: of the 335 data points that include
UDP hairpin translation results, only 80 (24%) show hair-
pin translation support.
Out of the 286 data points for TCP, 184 (64%) show
compatibility with TCP hole punching: the NAT consis-
tently translates the client’s private TCP endpoint, and
does not send back RST packets in response to unsolicited
incoming connection attempts. Hairpin translation sup-
port is again much less common: only 37 (13%) of the
reports showed hairpin support for TCP.
Since these reports were generated by a “self-selecting”
community of volunteers, they do not constitute a random
sample and thus do not necessarily represent the true dis-
tribution of the NATs in common use. The results are
nevertheless encouraging: it appears that the majority of
commonly-deployedNATs already support UDP and TCP
hole punching at least in single-level NAT scenarios.
6.3 Testing Limitations
There are a few limitations in NAT Check’s current test-
ing protocol that may cause misleading results in some
cases. First, we only learned recently that a few NAT im-
plementations blindly translate IP addresses they find in
unknown application payloads, and the NAT Check pro-
tocol currently does not protect itself from this behavior
by obfuscating the IP addresses it transmits.
Second, NAT Check’s current hairpin translation
checking may yield unnecessarily pessimistic results be-
cause it does not use the full, two-way hole punching pro-
cedure for this test. NAT Check currently assumes that a
NAT supporting hairpin translation does not filter “incom-
ing” hairpin connections arriving from the private network
in the way it would filter incoming connections arriving at
the public side of the NAT, because such filtering is unnec-
essary for security. We later realized, however, that a NAT
might simplistically treat any traffic directed at the NAT’s
public ports as “untrusted” regardless of its origin. We do
UDP TCP
Hole Hole
Punching Hairpin Punching Hairpin
NAT Hardware
Linksys 45/46 (98%) 5/42 (12%) 33/38 (87%) 3/38 (8%)
Netgear 31/37 (84%) 3/35 (9%) 19/30 (63%) 0/30 (0%)
D-Link 16/21 (76%) 11/21 (52%) 9/19 (47%) 2/19 (11%)
Draytek 2/17 (12%) 3/12 (25%) 2/7 (29%) 0/7 (0%)
Belkin 14/14 (100%) 1/14 (7%) 11/11 (100%) 0/11 (0%)
Cisco 12/12 (100%) 3/9 (33%) 6/7 (86%) 2/7 (29%)
SMC 12/12 (100%) 3/10 (30%) 8/9 (89%) 2/9 (22%)
ZyXEL 7/9 (78%) 1/8 (13%) 0/7 (0%) 0/7 (0%)
3Com 7/7 (100%) 1/7 (14%) 5/6 (83%) 0/6 (0%)
OS-based NAT
Windows 31/33 (94%) 11/32 (34%) 16/31 (52%) 28/31 (90%)
Linux 26/32 (81%) 3/25 (12%) 16/24 (67%) 2/24 (8%)
FreeBSD 7/9 (78%) 3/6 (50%) 2/3 (67%) 1/1 (100%)
All Vendors 310/380 (82%) 80/335 (24%) 184/286 (64%) 37/286 (13%)
Table 1: User Reports of NAT Support for UDP and TCP Hole Punching
not yet know which behavior is more common.
Finally, NAT implementations exist that consistently
translate the client’s private endpoint as long as only one
client behind the NAT is using a particular private port
number, but switch to symmetric NAT or even worse be-
haviors if two or more clients with different IP addresses
on the private network try to communicate through the
NAT from the same private port number. NAT Check
could only detect this behavior by requiring the user to
run it on two or more client hosts behind the NAT at the
same time. Doing so would make NAT Check much more
difficult to use, however, and impossible for users who
only have one usable machine behind the NAT. Neverthe-
less, we plan to implement this testing functionality as an
option in a future version of NAT Check.
6.4 Corroboration of Results
Despite testing difficulties such as those above, our results
are generally corroborated by those of a large ISP, who
recently found that of the top three consumer NAT router
vendors, representing 86% of the NATs observed on their
network, all three vendors currently produce NATs com-
patible with UDP hole punching [25]. Additional inde-
pendent results recently obtained using the UDP-oriented
STUN protocol [12], and STUNT, a TCP-enabled exten-
sion [8, 9], also appear consistent with our results. These
latter studies provide more information on each NAT by
testing a wider variety of behaviors individually, instead
of just testing for basic hole punching compatibility as
NAT Check does. Since these more extensive tests re-
quire multiple cooperating clients behind the NAT and
thus are more difficult to run, however, these results are
so far available on a more limited variety of NATs.
7 Related Work
UDP hole punching was first explored and publicly docu-
mented by Dan Kegel [13], and is by now well-known in
peer-to-peer application communities. Important aspects
of UDP hole punching have also been indirectly docu-
mented in the specifications of several experimental pro-
tocols, such as STUN [19], ICE [17], and Teredo [11]. We
know of no existing published work that thoroughly ana-
lyzes hole punching, however, or that points out the hair-
pin translation issue for multi-level NAT (Section 3.5).
We also know of no prior work that develops TCP
hole punching in the symmetric fashion described here.
Even the existence of the crucial SO_REUSEADDR/
SO_REUSEPORT options in the Berkeley sockets API
appears to be little-known among P2P application devel-
opers. NatTrav [4] implements a similar but asymmet-
ric TCP hole punching procedure outlined earlier in Sec-
tion 4.5. NUTSS [9] and NATBLASTER [1] implement
more complex TCP hole punching tricks that can work
around some of the bad NAT behaviors mentioned in Sec-
tion 5, but they require the rendezvous server to spoof
source IP addresses, and they also require the client appli-
cations to have access to “raw” sockets, usually available
only at root or administrator privilege levels.
Protocols such as SOCKS [14], UPnP [26], and MID-
COM [22] allow applications to traverse a NAT through
explicit cooperation with the NAT. These protocols are not
widely or consistently supported by NAT vendors or ap-
plications, however, and do not appear to address the in-
creasingly important multi-level NAT scenarios. Explicit
control of a NAT further requires the application to locate
the NAT and perhaps authenticate itself, which typically
involves explicit user configuration. When hole punching
works, in contrast, it works with no user intervention.
Recent proposals such as HIP [15] and FARA [2] ex-
tend the Internet’s basic architecture by decoupling a
host’s identity from its location [20]. IPNL [7], UIP [5, 6],
and DOA [27] propose schemes for routing across NATs
in such an architecture. While such extensions are prob-
ably needed in the long term, hole punching enables ap-
plications to work over the existing network infrastructure
immediately with no protocol stack upgrades, and leaves
the notion of “host identity” for applications to define.
8 Conclusion
Hole punching is a general-purpose technique for estab-
lishing peer-to-peer connections in the presence of NAT.
As long as the NATs involved meet certain behavioral
requirements, hole punching works consistently and ro-
bustly for both TCP and UDP communication, and can
be implemented by ordinary applications with no special
privileges or specific network topology information. Hole
punching fully preserves the transparency that is one of
the most important hallmarks and attractions of NAT, and
works even with multiple levels of NAT—though certain
corner case situations require hairpin translation, a NAT
feature not yet widely implemented.
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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a fully distributed VPN system
over peer-to-peer(P2P) network called Everywhere Local
Area network (ELA). ELA enables to establish private over-
lay network for VPN among nodes of a group without any
servers. As opposed to the existing VPN systems, nodes of
a group can build VPN without setting up a VPN server,
and there is no problem of a single-source bottleneck and
a single point of failure. Though it is known that VPN sys-
tem using TCP as tunneling protocol does not work well
[6],there are some nodes which can use only TCP because
of NAT or Firewall. Therefore each node uses both UDP
and TCP appropriately depending on the situation in ELA.
The topology of ELA-VPN mitigates performance deterio-
ration. We implemented a proto-type of ELA on Linux, and
show result of experimental latency between two nodes.
1 Introduction
Local Area Networks (LANs) are constructed at many
places such as corporations or universities to support a shar-
ing of knowledge and cooperative work smoothly. A Virtual
Private Network (VPN) enables a private connection to a
LAN through a public network such as the Internet. With
a VPN, data is sent between two nodes across a public net-
work in a manner that emulates a dial-link. There are two
types of VPN systems, one is used for connecting LANs
across the Internet, and the other is used to connect a re-
mote node to a LAN across the Internet.
These VPN systems, however, are not suitable for groups
that do not own their own LAN or when nodes of the group
are geographically dispersed. Because these VPN systems
require a remote access VPN server, it takes a lot of trou-
ble with setup and management of the server. All traffic go
through the server, and they have problem with traffic con-
gestion and a single point of failure. Therefore, the system
that establishes the dedicated VPN without a remote access
VPN server among geographically dispersed nodes is abso-
lutely necessary.
We propose Everywhere Local Area network (ELA) that
is a fully distributed VPN system over peer-to-peer (P2P)
network. ELA enables to establish a fully distributed VPN
called ELA-VPNwithout a remote access VPN server when
nodes communicate with each other. The P2P network of
ELA is classified into Core-Group and Edge-Group in con-
sideration of transport protocol, which realizes the efficient
routing over P2P network. ELA enables to use existing net-
work softwares for LAN without any modification of them.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we dis-
cuss existing VPN systems and define the goal of ELA. In
Section 3, we illustrate the design of ELA and the network
established by ELA. In Section 4, the detailed implementa-
tion of ELA is described. In Section 5, we experiment with
a proto-type of ELA, and show the result of it. Finally, we
state our conclusions and discuss further work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
SoftEther [3] and TinyVPN [7] emulate Ethernet hub and
network interface card (NIC), and each node with a virtual
NIC installed connects to the node with a virtual hub like
Figure 1 (a). Both systems require a node which provides
the functionality of virtual Ethernet hub, thus there is the
problem with a single-source bottleneck and a single point
of failure. In addition, both systems always use TCP to
carry encapsulated Ethernet frame, and there are always the
problem of performance deterioration because of TCP over
TCP [6]. In contrast, ELA does not have the problem with
a single-source bottleneck and a single point of failure be-
cause there is no server. Each node of ELA-VPN uses UDP
and TCP appropriately depending on the situation, thus the
performance deterioration because of TCP over TCP is mit-
igated.
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Figure 1. Topology of Existing VPNs and ELA
IVGMP(Internet VPN Group Management Protocol) [1]
is a protocol with which VPRN is constructed on the Inter-
net. Two or more LAN and node are connected with IPsec
mutually. The policy concerning security is managed col-
lectively with the server that is called VNOC(Virtual Net-
work Operation Center). However, the topology of VPN is
not defined. Router of the network which the nodes belong
to must correspond to IPsec.
3 Design of ELA
3.1 Overview
Nodes of ELA, deployed at various locations on the In-
ternet, establish an application-layer P2P network for VPN.
The VPN established by ELA is called ELA-VPN, and the
image of ELA-VPN is shown at Figure 1 (c). IP packets
from various network softwares are encrypted, and they are
forwarded to the node of destination over ELA-VPN. The
dedicated IP address for ELA-VPN is a private IP address
like 10.0.0.1, and they are assigned randomly to every node
within ELA-VPN. When a node communicates with other
node over ELA-VPN, the node specifies the dedicated IP
address of ELA-VPN as the destination IP address of any
network software.
3.2 Software Architecture
The conceptual design of ELA, shown in Figure 2, is
simple. ELA is composed of forwarder, router, and Net-
work Pseudo Device (NPD).
Each node in ELA-VPN communicates through its own
NPD as a node communicates through a network device on
the Internet. And any network software can use NPD as a
normal network device. Interface name of NPD is ela0,
and it is possible to assign IP address for ELA-VPN like
10.0.0.1 to NPD. If a node has IP address that it wants to
use, the node can use that address unless that address is al-
ready used by other node. If not, the node is assigned an
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Figure 2. The image of ELA system architecture and the
flow of an encapsulated IP packet on overlay network
IP address which is not used by other nodes. For IP pack-
ets within ELA-VPN that go through NPD, routing table is
configured as follows.
Destination Gateway Genmask Flags Iface
10.0.0.0 * 255.255.255.0 U ela0
133.27.xx.0 * 255.255.254.0 U eth0
127.0.0.0 * 255.0.0.0 U lo
default 133.27.xx.yy 0.0.0.0 UG eth0
Forwarder and router are a kind of application software.
Forwarder of each node consults with its router to deter-
mine the next node, and forwards encapsulated IP packets
after encrypting it. Routing mechanism of ELA-VPN is de-
scribed in the following subsection in more detail. To boot-
strap ELA-VPN, a new node needs to know host name or
IP address of at least one node in ELA-VPN. The new node
is classified into Core-Node or Edge-Node which are de-
scribed in the next subsection, and it makes its own NPD
and assign unique IP address to it.
Figure 2 shows the image of IP packet flow.
send When a network software of Node A sends an IP
packet whose destination is 10.0.0.2, the IP packet
goes through NPD. NPD forwards it to forwarder. For-
warder asks router the node to forward (Node B in this
case), encrypts the IP packet, and forwards it to Node
B through network device.
receive When forwarder of Node B receives the IP packet,
forwarder decrypts it, and sends it to NPD of Node B
because the destination of IP packet equals to 10.0.0.2.
NPD forwards it to the network software of Node B.
3.3 Network Topology and Routing
Nodes of ELA-VPN are classified into two groups, Core-
Group and Edge-Group. Core-Group is internal side of
ELA-VPN, and Edge-Group is external side of ELA-VPN.
The criterion of which group nodes belong to is whether to
use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) or Transmission Con-
trol Protocol (TCP) to communicate with other node. Gen-
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Figure 3. Network Topology of ELA-VPN. CNs are in
Core-Group, and ENs are in Edge-Group
erally as transport protocol, UDP and TCP are used by vari-
ous network softwares. It is known that VPN systems using
TCP as tunneling protocol do not work well because of long
delays and frequent connection aborts. OpenVPN [9] and
VTun [4] support either TCP or UDP as tunneling proto-
col, but they are recommended to use UDP because of that
reason. Some nodes, however, cannot use UDP to commu-
nicate because of Network Address Translation (NAT) or
Firewall. Those nodes only use TCP to communicate.
Therefore, each node of ELA-VPN uses UDP and TCP
appropriately depending on the situation. The node which
can use both UDP and TCP to communicate with others is
Core-Node (CN). The node which uses only TCP to com-
municate with others is Edge-Node (EN). Because CN can
use UDP to communicate with other CNs, CN assumes the
role of routing on ELA-VPN as shown in Figure 3. This
topology mitigates performance deterioration because TCP
over TCP does not affect entire ELA-VPN. Each EN con-
nects to one CN whose IP address is nearest and smaller
than the EN’s one. Each EN also connects to another CN
whose IP address is nearest and smaller than the CN’s one as
backup. If CN goes down, these ENs change the main CN
and connect to another CN as backup. Each CN uses UDP
to communicate with other CNs in one hop. The topology
of Core-Group is the mesh [8].
There are four patterns of hop based on whether sender
and receiver are CN or EN.
) + - / + - 2 + - / + -
For instance, 4 / 6 .
) + - / 8 - 2 + - ; / + - > / 8 -
For instance, 6 / 4 / B or 4 / B .
) 8 - / + - 2 8 - ; / + - > / + -
For instance, B / 4 / 6 or B / 4 .
) 8 - / 8 - 2 8 - / + - ; / + - > / 8 -
For instance, B / 4 / 6 / G or G / 6 / + .
Routing of ELA-VPN is very simple. Each node changes
the process of routing based on whether the node is CN or
EN. In the case of EN, the process is very simple. Since EN
has only one TCP connection to CN, EN always forwards
encapsulated IP packets to CN. In the case of CN, the pro-
cess is more complicated than the case of EN. 1) CN looks
for EN whose IP address on ELA-VPN equals to the desti-
nation of encapsulated IP packet from the list of ENs which
belongs to that CN. 2) If it is not found in the list of ENs,
CN looks for the node from the list of CNs which includes
itself. CN forwards to the other CN if found. 3) If it is not
found in the list of CNs and ENs, CN looks for CN whose
IP address on ELA-VPN is nearest and smaller than IP ad-
dress of the destination of encapsulated IP packet from the
list of CNs. If the CN is itself, CN abandons the encap-
sulated IP packet because the node of destination does not
exist. If not, CN forwards the packet to that CN.
4 Implementation of ELA
We have implemented a proto-type of ELA on Linux ker-
nel 2.4.20. This proto-type assumes the static number of
nodes. Forwarder and router are implemented as user-level
application softwares with C language (approximately 1150
lines in length), and forwarder uses Blowfish [2] algorithm
for encryption. NPD uses Universal TUN driver [5] which
is software network device for IP tunneling.
4.1 Network Pseudo Device
NPD receives IP packets instead of a physical media.
And NPD sends IP packets to forwarder instead of a phys-
ical media. NPD is implemented at kernel-level of UNIX
OS, and it is possible to assign IP address, broadcast ad-
dress, network mask, gateway address, and routing entry.
Forwarder uses system call read when forwarder receives
the whole IP packet from NPD. And forwarder uses system
call writewhen forwarder sends the whole IP packet from
NPD. NPD is shown at the left bottom of Figure 4.
4.2 Forwarder and Router
Forwarder, shown at the left top of Figure 4, carries en-
capsulated IP packets between NPD and other nodes’ for-
warder. For using UDP and TCP to communicate with other
nodes, we have implemented the forwarder using socket
API. Forwarder receives the encapsulated IP packets from
NPD and other nodes’ forwarder through the node’s own
network device (1). Forwarder encrypts the payload of
encapsulated IP packets which are from NPD. Forwarder
checks the destination field of an encapsulated IP packet.
When it equals to the node’s own IP address (2a), forwarder
decrypts an encapsulated IP packet, and forwards it to NPD.
When not (2b), forwarder asks the next node to forward of
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Figure 4. The image of implementation of ELA
router, and forwarder forwards an encapsulated IP packet to
other node’s forwarder by using UDP or TCP.
Router, shown at the right top of Figure 4, returns the
next node to forwarder. Router changes the process based
on whether the node is CN or EN. In the case of EN, router
always returns the file descriptor of TCP connection to CN
that the EN connects to. In the case of CN, router accom-
modates CN list and EN list. CN list includes mapping of
IP address in ELA-VPN and IP address in the Internet of all
CNs. EN list includes mapping of IP address in ELA-VPN
and file descriptor of TCP connection of ENs which con-
nects to the CN. Router looks for the next node from CN
list and EN list by using the algorithm which is described
in Section 3.3. And router returns IP address of other CN
or the file descriptor of TCP connection to EN, or router
suggests to abandon of the encapsulated IP packet.
5 Experimentation
To investigate latency caused by ELA, we have con-
ducted the following experiment. We prepared two note-
book PCs (CPU: PentiumM 1700MHz, Memory: 1024MB,
Ethernet Card: 100Base-TX), and those two nodes are con-
nected to the same Ethernet hub. We used ping 512 times
to measure Round Trip Time (RTT) between two nodes, and
evaluated the average and standard deviation of each in the
three cases. 1) Two nodes build ELA-VPN, and they run as
CNs. 2) Two nodes build ELA-VPN. One node runs as CN,
and the other runs as EN. 3) Measurement without ELA.
Table 1. Latency between two nodes.
Mean (msec) Std Dev (msec)
1) CNs 3.74 2.91
2) CN and EN 4.02 2.55
3) without ELA 0.22 0.04
Table 1 shows that 1) and 2) have longer latency and
varied more than 3), and there is not much difference be-
tween latencies of 1) and 2). The cause of longer latency is
the need for additional processing, which are transmitting
IP packets via user layer software, routing over ELA-VPN,
and encrypting.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed ELA that is a fully distributed VPN
system over P2P network. ELA enables to establish a fully
distributed VPN called ELA-VPNwithout any VPN servers
when nodes of a group communicate with each other for
cooperative work. The node of ELA-VPN is classified into
CN and EN by the presence of the limitation of communi-
cations such as NAT and Firewall. CNs are internal side of
ELA-VPN, and CNs communicate with other CNs directly
using UDP. Each EN connects to one CN using TCP, and
each EN communicates with other nodes via the CN. As
ELA do routing on ELA-VPN automatically, users don’t
need whether each node is CN or EN. Each nodes are as-
signed private IP address automatically,
Our future work includes an implementation of ELA
which includes new routing mechanism to enhance scalabil-
ity without increasing latency and overhead. Furthermore,
we evaluate the performance and scalability of it.
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APE`NDIX B. LLISTES DE CORREU
Linux's answer to MS-PPTP
1 message
Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Mon, Sep 22, 2003 at 2:28 PM
To: c ryptography@metzdowd.com
A friend of mine recently pointed me at CIPE, a Linux VPN tool that he c laimed
was widely used but that no-one else I know seems to have heard of.  Anyway, I
had a quick look at i t while I was at his place.  It has some problems.
CIPE lead me to another program, vtun, which is even worse.  Someone else then
told me about another one, tinc , which apparently was just as bad as CIPE and
vtun, but has been partial ly fixed after flaws were pointed out (i t sti l l  has
some problems, see below).  The fol lowing writeup covers some of the problems,
with conc lusions drawn at the end.  As you'l l  note from reading this, as I
went down the l ist of VPN software I got less and less interested in writing
up lengthy analyses, so CIPE (the first one I looked at) has the most detail .
CIPE
====
The fol lowing comments on CIPE apply to the protocol described at
http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/CIPE-Protocol.txt (the CIPE home
page).
Section 2, Packet Encryption:
- CIPE uses a CRC-32 for integrity-protec tion.  The use of a weak checksum
 under CFB or CBC has been known to be insecure for quite some time,
 providing no (or at least inadequate) integrity protec tion for the encrypted
 data.  This first gained widespread attention in 1998 with the Core SDI
 paper "An attack on CRC-32 integrity checks of encrypted channels using CBC
 and CFB modes" by Ariel Futoransky, Emil iano Kargieman, and Ariel M. Pacetti
 of CORE SDI S.A, which lead to the SSHv1 insertion attacks and the more or
 less complete abandonment of SSHv1.  To quote the Core SDI work:
  The use of these algorithms in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) or CFB (Cipher
  Feedback 64 bits) modes with the CRC-32 integrity check allows to perform a
  known plaintext attack (with as few as 16 bytes of known plaintext) that
  permits the insertion of encrypted packets with any choosen plaintext in
  the c l ient to server stream that wil l  subvert the integrity checks on the
  server and decrypt to the given plaintext, thus al lowing an attacker to
  execute arbitrary commands on the server.
 In other words this provides no real integrity protec tion for data.
 Although it first gained widespread public ity in the SSHv1 attacks, the fac t
 that this mechanism is insecure and shouldn't be used goes back to (at
 least) Kerberos v4 dating from the 1980s (the des-cbc-crc  mechanism was
 deprecated in Kerberos v5, the now ten-year-old RFC 1510).
- The padding length is l imited to 3 bits, making it unusable with any recent
 128-bit block c ipher.  In particular, AES can't be used.  In addition, the
 inabil i ty to pad to more than one (64-bit) c ipher block length makes it
 impossible to disguise message lengths by padding messages to a fixed size
 (there are further SSHv1 attacks that arose from similar problems there).
 This weakness is particularly problematic  when applied to section 3.
- There is no protec tion against message insertion or deletion.  In particular
 an attacker can delete or replay any message, and in combination with the
 weak checksum problem can replay modified messages.  Consider for example
 what would happen if an attacker can replay database transactions where
 money is involved.  This issue is also particularly problematic  when applied
 to section 3.
Recommendation to fix:
This portion of the protocol has a number of flaws, but can be fixed with a
more or less complete overhaul of the message format:
- Replace the weak checksum with a MAC l ike HMAC-SHA1.  If size is a concern,
 use a truncated HMAC (but not to a mere 32 bits, which is unconvinc ing).
 IPsec cargo-cult protocol design practice would seem to require a MAC size
 of at least 96 bits (IPsec truncated the MAC to 96 bits because that makes
 the AH header a nice size, with a payload length of exactly 128 bits (4 32-
 bit words); everyone else assumed that the number 96 had some magic
 significance and copied it into their own designs).
- Replace the padding with standard PKCS #5 padding, al lowing both the use of
 c iphers with block sizes > 64 bits and padding of messages to hide plaintext
 size.
- Either provide protec tion against insertion/deletion via message sequence
 numbers, or make it very explic it in the documentation that CIPE should not
 be used where insertion/deletion can be a problem, i.e. in situations where
 the higher-level protocol being tunneled doesn't provide its own mechanism
 for detec ting missing, inserted, or out-of-sequence messages.
A quick fix would be to take the SSL (or SSH) format, strip out the SSL
headers and encapsulation, and use what's left (the padding, MAC'ing, etc
etc).  SSL/SSH also provides message-sequence handling if you want this.
Section 3, Key exchange:
- The lack of integrity protec tion means that i t's possible to modify keys in
 transit.  As an extreme example, i f 3DES keys were used it'd be possible to
 fl ip the necessary bits to force the use of weak keys, so that both sides
 would end up sending plaintext.  CIPE doesn't appear to use 3DES, but does
 use IDEA, which also has weak keys.  In any case having an attacker able to
 set key bits in arbitrary ways is never a good thing (they could presumably
 force the use of an al l-zero or otherwise known key, which is only
 marginally better than sending in plaintext).
- The lack of replay protec tion means messages containing instruc tions to
 switch to old keys can be replayed.  In particular, re-use of a compromised
 key can be forced in this way.
- Since packets are ignored if the checksum is bad, i t's possible to no-op out
 key-change messages (forc ing continued use of a compromised key) by fl ipping
 a bit or two.
- The lack of abil i ty to mask the content length al lows key management packets
 to be quickly identified by an attacker, and the above attacks applied.  For
 example it looks l ike keyex packets wil l  always be 24 bytes long, while
 tunneled TCP packets wil l  never be that short.  In any case keyex packets
 are ID'd by the (plaintext) flag that indicates which key type is being
 used.
I'm sure I could find more problems if I thought about i t a bit more, but I
think that's about enough - see below for more.
Recommendation to fix:
Basically, this part of the protocol is beyond repair.  Any ac tive attacker
can cause about the same level of havoc that Schneier et al managed for
Microsoft's original PPTP implementation.  The fix for this is to scrap the
key exchange portion completely and replace it with an SSH or SSL management
tunnel, which provides the necessary confidential i ty, integrity protec tion,
authentication, message insertion/deletion protec tion, etc  etc .  Since control
messages are rarely sent, there's no performance penalty to using a TCP
channel for this portion of the protocol.  The alternative would be to more or
less reinvent SSH/SSL using CIPE, which doesn't seem like a useful exerc ise.
(Author contac ted, no response).
vtun
====
While googling for more CIPE info, I found another Linux encrypted tunnel
package, vtun.  Ugh, this makes CIPE look l ike a paragon of good crypto design
in comparison.  Although the format is undocumented, from a quick look at the
source code it appears that vtun uses Blowfish in ECB mode with no integrity
protec tion, and as for CIPE no protec tion against message insertion or
deletion, replay attacks, etc  etc .  Eeek!  Then there are code fragments l ike:
void encrypt_chal(char *chal, char *pwd)
{
  char * xor_msk = pwd;
  register int i , xor_len = strlen(xor_msk);
  for(i=0; i  < VTUN_CHAL_SIZE; i++)
     chal[i ] ^= xor_msk[i%xor_len];
}
[...]
void gen_chal(char *buf)
{
  register int i ;
  srand(time(NULL));
  for(i=0; i  < VTUN_CHAL_SIZE; i++)
     buf[i ] = (unsigned int)(255.0 * rand()/RAND_MAX);
}
which sort of speak for themselves.  Furthermore, the key is just a straight
hash of the password (no salt, i terated hashing, or other standard precautions
are used).  I feel somewhat bad for the author(s) of vtun because it looks
like there's been a fair bit of work put into i t, but honestly my best
recommendation for this in terms of security is to scrap it and start again.
(Some more googling for vtun info found a post by Jerome Etienne from January
 2002 pointing out these exact same problems, so the fac t that i t has horrible
 security problems has been known for quite some time.  Nothing appears to
 have been fixed in the nearly two years since the problems were pointed out).
tinc
====
So I sent a rough set of notes out for comment and someone pointed me to tinc .
tinc  uses a completely predic table 32-bit IV in combination with CBC
encryption, which makes the first encrypted block vulnerable, but isn't quite
as bad as the ECB used in vtun (ac tually i t isn't an IV in the true sense, i t
prepends a 32-bit sequence number to the encrypted data, but i t works the same
way).  Packets are protec ted with a 32-bit (very) truncated HMAC using
encrypt-then-MAC.
tinc 's real problem though is the handshake protocol, in which the c l ient and
server exchange random RSA-encrypted strings.  That's raw bit strings, there's
no PKCS #1 or OAEP padding, and the server is happy to ac t as an orac le for
you too.  This is a terrible way to use RSA, and usually compromises the key.
There is a significant body of l i terature on this (too much to c ite) going
back to the early 1980s and continuing through to the current day, with
probably the most recent publication in this area being the attack published
at Usenix Security '03 only a few weeks ago (in that case it was a timing
orac le).
Beyond that, the protocol writeup
(http://tinc .nl.l inux.org/documentation/tinc_6.html#SEC61) points out that:
 the server sends exactly the same kind of messages over the wire as the
 c l ient
In case the problem isn't obvious yet, note that what's being exchanged is
purely a random bit string, with no binding of c l ient or server roles or
identities into any part of the exchange.  Again, there are way too many
references to c ite on these issues, although my favourite coverage of a lot of
the things you need to think about is in "Network Security: Private
Communication in a Public  World" by Kaufman, Perlman, and Spec iner.  As an
example, here's a simple attack.  The documentation (section 6.3.1) is a bit
vague about the message flow, but assuming I've understood it correc tly, the
message flow is:
 c l ient                                   server
              rsa( random_key ) -->
            random_key( challenge ) -->
        <-- random_key( sha1( challenge ) )
Simplifying things a bit so that the entire exchange can be abstrac ted down to
"challenge" and "response" (with implied RSA decryption, etc  etc  taking place
as part of that), let's say Mallet wants to mess with Alice and Bob.  So
Mallet sends a challenge to Bob (c laming to be Alice) and gets back a
response.  Mallet gets Bob's encrypted key and challenge back and forwards it
to Alice, who returns a response, which Mallet in turn forwards to Bob, a
c lassic  chess grandmaster attack.  Bob now thinks he's talking to Alice, when
in fac t Mallet controls one of the two channels.
If the exchange is something l ike rcp (where al l  traffic  is one-way, you write
the entire fi le and c lose the connection), that's al l  that's needed, Mallet
just sits there sucking down the data that Bob thinks is going to Alice.  If
not, Mallet does the same thing to Alice, who thinks she's talking to Bob.
Again, Mallet now has a one-way channel to Alice.  Mallet can then splice the
two channels that he controls, so he has a channel in both direc tions.  Again,
depending on the protocol being tunneled, i t may be possible for Mallet to use
the write channel he controls to get data sent on the read channel he
controls.
As an extension of the handshake problem, tinc  rel ies heavily on an
administrator at both ends of the l ink configuring the software identically
for the handling of the handshake phase, replac ing the authenticated parameter
negotiation performed by protocols l ike SSL/TLS, SSH, and IPsec (during the
data transfer phase there are ways of negotiating parameters, I haven't looked
at this too much).
Overall , tinc  isn't anywhere near as bad as CIPE or vtun, but l ike CIPE it
should have the handshake/control channel replaced with an SSH or SSL tunnel,
and the data-transfer portion could be improved as well.  The tinc  handshake
protocol would also make a nice homework exerc ise for students in computer
security courses, since it's not trivial ly broken but does exhibits various
textbook handshake-protocol flaws, violating a great many of the general
princ iples of secure protocol design:
 - Don't use the same key for encryption and authentication.
 - Don't have the key chosen entirely by one side (even if i t's only Alice
   and Bob on the l ine rather than Mallet, i f one of the two has a poor RNG,
   al l  communications from them are compromised).
 - Provide message freshness guarantees (and, i f possible, some form of PFS).
 - Bind the identity of the princ ipals to the authentication.
 - Don't use the same messages in both direc tions.
 - Don't ac t as an orac le for an attacker.
As it stands the handshake protocol only narrowly avoids a variety of basic
attacks, making it quite brittle in that the most trivial change (or someone
thinking about possible attacks a bit further :-) would probably ki l l  i t.
(Following on from the footnote at the end of the vtun bit, the same Jerome
 Etienne who pointed out problems in vtun also picked apart an earl ier version
 of tinc , which looks to have been at about the same level as CIPE when he
 looked at i t.  A lot of i t appears to have been fixed since then.
 Authors contac ted, their response was that the problems were not that
 serious, and that a main goal of tinc  was to get the opportunity to
 experiment with secure tunneling protocols and mechanisms (other design goals
 are at http://tinc .nl.l inux.org/goals).
Thoughts
========
Several points arise from this writeup:
- These programs have been around for years (CIPE goes back to 1996 and vtun
 to 1998) and (apparently) have quite sizeable user communities without
 anyone having noticed (or caring, after flaws were pointed out) that they
 have security problems.  I only heard of CIPE when a friend of mine
 mentioned it to me in passing, and came across vtun by coinc idence when I
 was looking for more info on CIPE.  Who knows how many more insecure Linux
 crypto-tunnel products there may be floating around out there.
- It's possible to c reate insecure "security" products just as readily with
 open-source as with c losed-source software.  CIPE and vtun must be the OSS
 community's answer to Microsoft's PPTP implementation.  What's even worse is
 that some of the flaws were pointed out nearly two years ago, but despite
 the hype about open-source products being quicker with security fixes, some
 of the protocols sti l l  haven't been fixed.  At least Microsoft eventually
 tries to fix their stuff, given suffic ient public  embarrassment and the odd
 hundred thousand or so computers being taken out by attackers.
- For al l  of these VPN apps, the authors state that they were motivated to
 c reate them as a reaction to the perceived complexity of protocols l ike SSL,
 SSH, and IPsec.  The means of reduc ing the complexity was to strip out al l
 those nasty security features that made the protocols complex (and secure).
 Now if you're Bruce Schneier or Niels Ferguson, you're al lowed to reinvent
 SSL ("Practical Cryptography", John Wiley & Sons, 2003).  Unfortunately the
 people who created these programs are no Bruce or Niels.  The results are
 predic table.
- Whenever someone thinks that they can replace SSL/SSH with something much
 better that they designed this morning over coffee, their computer speakers
 should generate some sort of penis-shaped sound wave and plunge it
 repeatedly into their skulls unti l  they achieve enlightenment.  Replac ing
 the SSL/SSH data channel is marginally justi fiable, although usually just
 running SSL/SSH over UDP would be suffic ient.  Replac ing the SSL/SSH control
 channel is never justi fiable - even the WAP guys, with strong non-SSL/SSH
 requirements, simply adapted SSL rather than trying to invent their own
 protocol.
Thanks to Greg Rose for checking a draft copy, and Matt Robinson for inspiring
the sound-wave comment (I wonder how many mail fi l ters that'l l  get caught
on?).
Peter (sigh).
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mail ing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
Double Encryption Q
4 messages
COMINT <comint@gmail.com> Fri, Apr 11, 2008 at 4:30 PM
To: c ryptography@metzdowd.com
Quick system scenario:
You have packet [A].
It gets encrypted using an AES algo in a particular mode and we are
left with [zA].
More data [B] is added to that encrypted packet.
Now I have [zA]+[B] in one packet and I re-encrypt i t with the same
algo/key/mode.
Have I just compromised the security somehow? I wasn't aware of
anything but something about this double encryption made something
ring in my mind so I wanted to double check...
Many thanks,
Mr Pink
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mail ing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
Jack Lloyd <lloyd@randombit.net> Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 5:16 PM
Reply-To: c ryptography@metzdowd.com
To: c ryptography@metzdowd.com
[Quoted text hidden]
This would certainly cause problems in i f "particular mode" == OFB or
counter, since (i f you also reuse the IVs), you could have E(zA) == A.
If you use a different (independent, unrelated) key/IV, then the
existence of a weakness in this scheme would seem to provide evidence
of an attack on AES, regardless of mode choice.
-Jack
[Quoted text hidden]
Pehr Söderman <Pehrs@kth.se> Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 10:44 PM
To: COMINT <comint@gmail.com>, c ryptography@metzdowd.com
There are some situations when this can be dangerous. It's a matter of
implementation. I can direc tly come up with one trivial scenario that
wil l  end you up in trouble:
Assume that you are using AES-CTR (AES in Counter mode) and do not
change the IV between the two encryptions. In this case you wil l
correc tly encrypt the data, but the second encryption wil l  leave A
unprotec ted.
/Pehr Söderman
[Quoted text hidden]
Martin James Cochran <Martin.Cochran@colorado.edu> Sat, Apr 19, 2008 at 1:09AM
To: COMINT <comint@gmail.com>
Cc: c ryptography@metzdowd.com
If your original mode of operation is secure, then this should be secure.
The reduction:
Consider algorithm A that tries to break the double encryption mode of operation (DM) in the
IND-CPA setting.  We can construc t an algorithm B that tries to break the original mode of
operation (OM) in the IND-CPA setting.  B simply runs A and responds to A's queries by querying
B's orac le twice to simulate A's orac le, and returning the result.  B returns the output of A.
If A breaks the encryption, so does B.  So if the original mode is IND-CPA secure, this double
encryption should be okay.
Note that the examples given, OCB and CTR with repeated counters, are not IND-CPA secure.
Martin Cochran
[Quoted text hidden]
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APE`NDIX C. CONCEPTES BA`SICS
Aquest capı´tol s’expliquen conceptes ba`sics de telema`tica a nivell general. Esta` destinat
a les persones que no han cursat l’especialitat de telema`tica. En cas de voler adquirir un
coneixement me´s profund es recomana llegir fonts me´s te`cniques com els RFCs del IETF.
C.1. Transport Layer Security
Extracted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security
More information: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryp-
tographic protocols that provide secure communications on the Internet for such things as
web browsing, e-mail, Internet faxing, instant messaging and other data transfers. There
are slight differences between SSL and TLS, but they are essentially the same.
The TLS protocol allows applications to communicate across a network in a way designed
to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. TLS provides endpoint au-
thentication and communications privacy over the Internet using cryptography. Typically,
only the server is authenticated (i.e., its identity is ensured) while the client remains unau-
thenticated; this means that the end user (whether an individual or an application, such
as a Web browser) can be sure with whom it is communicating. The next level of security
— in which both ends of the ”conversation” are sure with whom they are communicating
— is known as mutual authentication. Mutual authentication requires public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) deployment to clients unless TLS-PSK or the Secure Remote Password (SRP)
protocol are used, which provide strong mutual authentication without needing to deploy a
PKI.
TLS involves three basic phases:
1. Peer negotiation for algorithm support
2. Key exchange and authentication
3. Symmetric cipher encryption and message authentication
During the first phase, the client and server negotiate cipher suites, which determine the
ciphers to be used, the key exchange and authentication algorithms, as well as the mes-
sage authentication codes (MACs). The key exchange and authentication algorithms are
typically public key algorithms, or as in TLS-PSK preshared keys could be used. The
message authentication codes are made up from cryptographic hash functions using the
HMAC construction for TLS, and a non-standard pseudorandom function for SSL.
Typical algorithms could be:
• For key exchange: RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, SRP, PSK
• For authentication: RSA, DSA, ECDSA
• Symmetric ciphers: RC4, Triple DES, AES, IDEA, DES, or Camellia. In older ver-
sions of SSL, RC2 was also used.
• For cryptographic hash function: HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA are used for TLS, MD5
and SHA for SSL, while older versions of SSL also used MD2 and MD4.
C.2. Authentication Header
Extracted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authentication_Header
More information: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4835
Two protocols have been developed to provide packet-level security for both IPv4 and IPv6:
• The IP Authentication Header provides integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation
if the appropriate choice of cryptographic algorithms is made.
• The IP Encapsulating Security Payload provides confidentiality, along with optional
(but strongly recommended) authentication and integrity protection.
Cryptographic algorithms defined for use with IPsec include HMAC-SHA1 for integrity pro-
tection, and TripleDES-CBC and AES-CBC for confidentiality. Refer to RFC 4835 for de-
tails.
The AH is intended to guarantee connectionless integrity and data origin authentication
of IP datagrams. Further, it can optionally protect against replay attacks by using the
sliding window technique and discarding old packets. AH protects the IP payload and all
header fields of an IP datagram except for mutable fields, i.e. those that might be altered
in transit. In IPv4, mutable (and therefore unauthenticated) IP header fields include TOS,
Flags, Fragment Offset, TTL and Header Checksum. AH operates directly on top of IP,
using IP protocol number 51. An AH packet diagram:
bits 0–7 8–15 16-23 24–31
0 Next header Payload lenght RESERVED
32 Security parameters index (SPI)
64 Sequence number
96 Authentication data (variable)
Field meanings:
• Next header: Identifies the protocol of the transferred data.
• Payload length: Size of AH packet.
• RESERVED: Reserved for future use (all zero until then).
• Security parameters index (SPI): Identifies the security parameters, which, in com-
bination with the IP address, then identify the security association implemented with
this packet.
• Sequence number: A monotonically increasing number, used to prevent replay
attacks.
• Authentication data: Contains the integrity check value (ICV) necessary to authen-
ticate the packet; it may contain padding.
C.3. Certificate Authority
Extracted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority
A CA issues digital certificates which contain a public key and the identity of the owner.
The CA also attests that the public key contained in the certificate belongs to the per-
son, organization, server or other entity noted in the certificate. A CA’s obligation in such
schemes is to verify an applicant’s credentials, so that users and relying parties can trust
the information in the CA’s certificates.
If the user trusts the CA and can verify the CA’s signature, then they can also verify that a
certain public key does indeed belong to whoever is identified in the certificate. If the CA
can be subverted, then the security of the entire system is lost.
Suppose an attacker, Mallory (to use the Alice and Bob convention), manages to get a CA
to issue a false certificate tying Alice to the wrong public key; the corresponding private
key is known to Mallory. If Bob subsequently obtains and uses Alice’s public key in this
(bogus) certificate, the security of his communications to her could be compromised by
Mallory - since Bob’s messages could be decrypted by Mallory, or Bob could be tricked
into accepting signatures which are forged to appear to be from Alice.
The problem of assuring correctness of match between data and entity when the data are
presented to the CA (perhaps over an electronic network), and when the credentials of the
person/company/program asking for a certificate are likewise presented, is difficult. This
is why commercial CAs often use a combination of authentication techniques including
leveraging government bureaus, the payment infrastructure, third parties’ databases and
services, and custom heuristics. In some enterprise systems, local forms of authentication
such as Kerberos can be used to obtain a certificate which can in turn be used by external
relying parties. Notaries are required in some cases to personally know the party whose
signature is being notarized; this is a higher standard than can be reached for many CAs.
According to the American Bar Association outline on Online Transaction Management
the primary points of federal and state statutes that have been enacted regarding digital
signatures in the United States has been to ”prevent conflicting and overly burdensome
local regulation and to establish that electronic writings satisfy the traditional requirements
associated with paper documents.” Further the E-Sign and UETA code help ensure that:
1. a signature, contract or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied
legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and
2. a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity or
enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used
in its formation.
In large-scale deployments, Alice may not be familiar with Bob’s certificate authority (per-
haps they each have a different CA), so Bob’s certificate may also include his CA’s public
key signed by a different CA2, which is presumably recognizable by Alice. This process
typically leads to a hierarchy or mesh of CAs and CA certificates.
C.4. Proprietary Software
Extracted from: http://www.fsf.org/about/what-is-free-software
Free software is software that gives you the user the freedom to share, study
and modify it. We call this free software because the user is free.
To use free software is to make a political and ethical choice asserting the right
to learn, and share what we learn with others. Free software has become the
foundation of a learning society where we share our knowledge in a way that
others can build upon and enjoy.
Currently, many people use proprietary software that denies users these
freedoms and benefits. If we make a copy and give it to a friend, if we try to
figure out how the program works, if we put a copy on more than one of our
own computers in our own home, we could be caught and fined or put in jail.
That’s what’s in the fine print of the license agreement you accept when using
proprietary software.
The corporations behind proprietary software will often spy on your activities
and restrict you from sharing with others. And because our computers control
much of our personal information and daily activities, proprietary software
represents an unacceptable danger to a free society.
Extracted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proprietary_software
Proprietary software is computer software on which the producer has set re-
strictions on use, private modification, copying, or republishing. Similar terms
include ”closed-source software” and ”non-free software”.
Proprietors may enforce restrictions by technical means, such as by restrict-
ing source code access, or by legal means, such as through copyright and
patents.
Exclusive legal rights to software by a proprietor are not required for software
to be proprietary, since public domain software and software under a per-
missive licence can become proprietary software by distributing compiled
(binary) versions of the program without making the source code available.
Proprietary software includes freeware and shareware.
Software distributions considered as proprietary may in fact incorporate a
”mixed source” model including both free and non-free software in the same
distribution. Most if not all so-called proprietary UNIX distributions are mixed
source software, bundling open source components and others along with a
purely proprietary kernel and system utilities.
For some free software, the same laws used by proprietary software are
used to preserve the freedoms to use, copy and modify the software. This
technique is called copyleft.
